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# USSR Report

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No. 2, February 1981



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## USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 2, February 1981

Translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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## THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES. THE STRUGGLE INTENSIFIES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 pp 3-14

[Article by V. A. Kromenyuk]

[Text] The "serious increase in the influence of states that were just recently colonies or semicolonies"<sup>1</sup> was pointed out as an important factor in international life at the 25th CPSU Congress. The events of the last 5 years and the current state of world affairs on the threshold of the 26th CPSU Congress completely confirm the assessment given to the significance and role of the liberated Asian, African and Latin American states in the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Congress: "It can definitely be said that most of them are defending their political and economic rights with increasing vigor in the struggle against imperialism and are striving to consolidate their independence and raise the level of the social, economic and cultural development of their people."<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Union, as L. I. Brezhnev announced from the congress rostrum, fully supports these legitimate aims of the young states.

The active anti-imperialist position of the majority of developing countries is arousing increasing anxiety in the ruling circles of Western countries, particularly the United States of America. It was no coincidence that, just after he had taken office, President Carter announced in 1977 that one of the primary objectives of his administration would be increased concern for the developing countries. In his speech at Notre Dame University in May 1977, he advocated the creation of a "broader system of international cooperation." He said that the system should consist of the United States' partners and allies from among the developed states, as well as a group of influential Asian, African and Latin American countries with valuable raw materials, known industrial potential and other resources of importance to American capitalism. In this way, Carter hoped to demonstrate that his administration would take a thoroughly considered, comprehensive approach, which would allow the United States to take the growing role of the developing countries in world politics and economics into account and even help them to find ways of solving some of their most pressing problems. This is how Washington expected to elevate U.S. prestige and strengthen its position and influence in the Asian, African and Latin American countries.

The American President's statement aroused great interest in the liberated states. Many of them are extremely in need of foreign credit, particularly the countries which do not have natural resources and do not export sources of energy. For some Asian, African and Latin American countries, American deliveries of foodstuffs are

still an important part of their food supply. The United States could also play a definite positive role in the resolution of other problems, particularly in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, southern Africa and Latin America. In other words, if President Carter's declarations had been acted upon even partially, this would have had a positive effect on the complex and tense situation in the developing world.

What has changed in the last 4 years and what kind of excess baggage in the area of relations with developing countries did the United States carry into the 1980's? Answering this question in a message to the Democratic Party Platform Committee for the 1980 election, J. Carter was generous with praise for his administration: America has become a "positive force, contributing to stabilizing changes in our stormy world"; the United States, in his opinion, has "more healthy and more productive relations" with the young states today. The President's message indicated obvious satisfaction with the state of affairs in U.S. relations with the developing countries--a satisfaction which is incomprehensible to many in the United States, and not only there.

According to American experts and representatives of the business community and political groups, the objective facts testify to the opposite: In the 4 years of the Carter Administration, relations between the United States and the developing countries deteriorated considerably, and all of the efforts of the American Government to "stabilize" the developing world and to find and utilize American solutions for their most pressing and urgent problems (from such issues as the Middle East conflict to more general problems in trade and development) were essentially futile. The United States is virtually in a state of confrontation with the developing countries in all areas of its interrelations with them. This is also attested to by the appraisal of the Carter Administration's policy in the developing countries by America's allies, who have unequivocally shown a preference to dissociate themselves from Washington's actions and have independent relations with the young states.

As for the developing states themselves, they are almost unanimous in assessing the state of their relations with the United States negatively. Countries with a progressive, non-capitalist orientation, non-aligned countries, countries taking the capitalist road of development, many of the United States' allies and their "traditional friends" (Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Pakistan) and even some dependent puppet regimes--all of them, for various reasons and on various grounds, are not concealing their dissatisfaction with Washington's behavior, and anyone who speaks of any kind of success in American policy is ignoring the facts.

But meanwhile, the capitalist world is suffering from another economic crisis, the scales of which have not yet taken their final shape, and it is believed that the developing countries could play a perceptible role in overcoming this crisis. The general state of international affairs deteriorated considerably as a result of U.S. actions in the Near and Middle East, the Caribbean and Southeast Asia. Under these conditions, the international situation will be influenced considerably by the future course of relations between the largest imperialist state and the large group of young states whose resources and international role are beginning to have an extremely significant effect on the solidity of the world positions of the United States and its chief allies.



## The Main Results of the 1970's

When U.S. foreign policy strategy for the 1970's was being mapped out, the problems of the developing countries were thoroughly discussed in the American press and in statements by national leaders. At that time, however, these problems were seen in a different way.

"We believe," the authors of one work on U.S. policy for the 1970's wrote, "that the developing countries are presently in a state of dynamic stability, in which there is a great deal of movement and change but few final results...."

"The greatest danger posed to the United States by the developing countries is the temptation they offer for intervention. The permanent chaos in these countries is interpreted by us as danger of the highest order. For the United States it would be expedient to weaken the connection between its national interest and events in the developing countries."

The "Nixon Doctrine" took precisely this course--one which the U.S. Government was compelled to take by objective circumstances: the failure of the intervention in Indochina, the impasse in the Middle East, and the changing balance of power in the international arena which hampered American imperialism's freedom of action in so-called "peripheral" regions. The decreased level of U.S. military and political activity in the Asian, African and Latin American countries certainly did not mean that Washington had decided against any further intervention in their affairs. The actions of the American Armed Forces in Indochina in 1969-1973 and at the time of the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1971, the CIA-organized coup in Chile in 1973, the intervention in the conflict on Cyprus in 1974 and many other facts quite eloquently testify that although the intensity of U.S. intervention in the developing world was not as great as in the 1960's, the American Government was still trying to control events here. "It is obvious that the Nixon Administration assigned less significance to the Third World in the system of our priorities," wrote the authors of a special brochure compiled for the 1976 presidential election, using the term "Third World" to signify the developing countries, "but this did not reflect a reassessment of our interests, which have essentially remained unchanged, as much as a reassessment of the extent of the threat to these interests."<sup>5</sup>

The objective course of events, however, particularly the oil embargo of the Arab oil-exporting countries at the time of the "October War" of 1973 in the Middle East, the OPEC decision to raise the price of crude oil, the statement made by the developing countries (the "group of 77") at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly in April 1974, in which they demanded the radical revision of economic relations with the developed capitalist countries, and many other independent actions by the developing states in the international arena conclusively proved that the widely held opinion among American experts in the early and mid-1970's--that the developing countries were incapable of "creating any serious difficulties" for the United States--was false. Taking the changes in the global balance of power into account, the developing countries put the pressing problem of eliminating unfair relations in the world capitalist market on the agenda. Their position, reinforced by the unity of the "group of 77" and the support of the world socialist community, had a considerable effect on the position of the developed capitalist powers on dealt a blow to U.S. influence.



In the mid-1970's, the U.S. Government had to revise much of its foreign policy strategy and give more attention to the problems of the developing countries. These changes were reflected in the Ford-Kissinger strategy of so-called "selective favoritism," which, in addition to reliance on such "trusted" partners as Israel, South Korea and South Africa, envisaged stronger ties between Washington and Saudi Arabia--the largest exporter of oil in the capitalist world, the shah's Iran--regarded as a "pillar of stability" in the Persian Gulf zone, and Brazil--a growing center of influence in Latin America. The United States displayed more interest in contacts with other large countries--India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Mexico and Venezuela.

At the same time, the Republican Administration tried to introduce a "new" means of defending U.S. interests. Further progress in the talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons was made conditional on absolutely unsubstantiated demands and far-fetched requests for the curtailment of support for revolutionary and liberation movements, the cessation of "intervention" in Africa, the dismantling of "bases" in the Indian Ocean, and so forth. This approach slowed down the progress of the Soviet-U.S. talks, and it also increased tension in several parts of the developing world--the Middle East, southern Africa, Southeast Asia and Central America.

The foreign policy failures of the United States contributed to the mounting criticism of the Republicans in American political and academic circles. A definite role in this criticism was played by some works by Z. Brzezinski, who was then director of Columbia University's Research Institute on Communist Affairs, in New York. As the head of the Trilateral Commission, founded in 1973, he launched a carefully planned assault on the foreign policy line of the Republicans from the position of "active globalism," taking advantage of the dissatisfaction of influential business and political groups in the United States with Washington's failures in the developing countries. Some of his theories lay at the basis of the Democrats' foreign policy line. These were the proposal to create a "new global structure," including a "triangle" consisting of the United States, the Western European "big nine" and Japan; "special relations" with the largest and most influential developing countries, particularly OPEC members (the so-called "upper tier"); patronage of a group of comparatively poor and "restless" countries by the West and the "upper tier." The purpose of creating the "global structure," according to Brzezinski's plans, was not merely to "rearrange" relations in the capitalist world and relations with the developing countries on American terms, but also to gain a definite advantage over the Soviet Union in the future.<sup>6</sup> In essence, he was trying to combine the idea of more orderly economic relations in the world capitalist market with the tradition of anti-Sovietism, in the belief that anti-Sovietism could serve as the basis for strengthening the solidarity of the "triangle" (although the views of the United States and Western Europe diverged considerably in this sphere), would help to establish closer relations between Washington and Beijing and would play a part in strengthening relations with the developing states. This theory "absorbed" Kissinger's idea of "conditionality" and even raised it to a higher level, giving the anti-Sovietism of U.S. policy in the developing countries the status of a "moral imperative."

In this context, a special place is occupied by the "crescent of instability" concept set forth by Brzezinski in late 1978 and early 1979. According to this theory, events in the basin of the Indian Ocean, which includes East Africa, the

Near and Middle East, the Hindustan subcontinent and Southeast Asia, or, in other words, the majority of the liberated states experiencing upheavals from unresolved socioeconomic problems, exacerbated by direct and indirect imperialist aggression (the export of weapons, the support of anti-people regimes, the encouragement of separatism and chauvinism), were supposedly benefiting the USSR. "The crescent of crisis," he declared, "stretches along the shores of the Indian Ocean, where fragile social and political structures, of vital importance to us, are in danger of collapsing. The ensuing political chaos could be filled with elements hostile to our values and sympathetic to our adversary."<sup>7</sup>

The thesis of the "crescent of instability," in spite of its patent absurdity, was viewed in Washington primarily as a convenient propaganda means of blaming the political "instability" of a number of states in this region on "Moscow's intrigues," and secondly as a convenient pretext for the buildup of U.S. military presence there. As early as 1978, after Washington put a stop to the Soviet-U.S. talks on the limitation of military activity in the Indian Ocean, this region became an arena of the rapid augmentation of U.S. military presence. In 1979 and 1980 more than 30 naval ships and several Marine battalions were transferred to this zone.

The evolution of American policy in the Indian Ocean zone quite clearly points up the changes in Washington's general foreign policy line in relations with the developing countries. Whereas the U.S. Government originally demonstrated a willingness to investigate problems in relations between developed capitalist powers and developing countries separately from East-West relations, by the end of the 1970's, according to prominent American expert R. Hansen, it demonstrated that its main objective was confrontation with the Soviet Union in any matter and in any part of the world, and that relations with the developing countries were merely one element of this global confrontation.<sup>8</sup>

In this way, by commencing the formation of their foreign policy strategy with criticism of the Republicans and the advancement, as early as 1974-1976, of tempting proposals regarding the "renovation" of the international system (they are recorded in Trilateral Commission reports of that time), the Democrats finally arrived at military and political confrontation with the developing countries and an attempt to resume the use of cold war methods and principles. The "rapid deployment force," originally conceived of as a means of counteracting the socialist countries' assistance of people fighting for their independence, was frankly viewed in Washington as a means of exerting direct pressure on the developing countries by the beginning of the 1980's.

It should be stressed that, from the very beginning, most of the developing states discouraged the U.S. Government's attempts to play the card of the "Soviet threat" in order to strengthen relations with leading countries in the developing world and simultaneously push economic problems into the background. By the end of the 1970's, this motivated Washington to rely even more on force in relations with the developing countries and it simultaneously created an even deeper separation between these countries and the developed capitalist powers. The new threats addressed to the developing countries, which have become the basic content of Washington's foreign policy, evoked only feelings of profound disillusionment in those who had hoped that the U.S. Administration would find a solid and lasting solution for the problems of the world capitalist economy and would strengthen American international positions.

## The Two Sides of 'Interdependence'

As elements of rigidity and the insistence on confrontation grew stronger in Washington's policy, references to another means of "renovating" the system of relations with the developing countries--the strategy of "interdependence"--virtually disappeared from the vocabulary of American politicians. Statements by the U.S. President and other officials, promising development assistance, the revision of some obviously faulty forms of economic relations and the construction of "genuine interdependence," that were characteristic of the 1977-1978 period, later became simply part of a stereotypical set of phrases, and then were taken out of circulation altogether.

Many representatives of U.S. business and political circles regard this as a major strategic error. As early as 1975, the annual report of the Overseas Development Council stated: "We have received a serious challenge, complicated by the inordinately increased desire of countries to the South for greater equality--the challenge to live in conditions of growing interdependence."<sup>9</sup> The authors of this work, prominent experts on international affairs, were disturbed by the changing patterns of relations between the United States and the developing countries, as well as by the fact that many in the United States did not fully realize, they felt, the implications of the new situation.

Despite the universal nature of the term "interdependence," as it is used by those in the United States who write or speak about relations with the developing countries, in principle we can distinguish between two approaches to the matter.

One is the official approach, which began to be widely used in government documents in 1975. In this interpretation, "interdependence" signifies only the increased dependence of the largest developing countries with the richest resources on the United States, with a simultaneous heightening of U.S. interest in them. The Democrats' strategy incorporated this approach in full, and, in the policy of the Carter Administration, "interdependence" began to mean that new regions in the developing world would be declared "vitally important" to the United States, particularly the Persian Gulf zone.

But far from all the members of the American business and academic communities agree with this interpretation of "interdependence." Without denying the need to strengthen U.S. positions in countries with valuable natural resources, several American politicians and representatives of the academic community realize that the economic and social stability of the developed capitalist powers will depend to an increasing degree on the actions and positions of the developing countries. As the exploited segment of the world capitalist economy, these countries could, after winning state independence, exert increasing pressure on the developed capitalist powers to attain their own goals, and this pressure will be backed up by the actual balance of power in the world.

For U.S. ruling circles, this situation became a tangible fact in the 1970's. In the past, when the United States had a huge domestic market and all of the basic types of industrial and energy resources, it depended relatively little on the foreign market and on international market conditions. In recent years, however, in connection with the overseas expansion of the American monopolies and the relative decrease of raw materials in the domestic market, the United States has become more and more dependent on imports of oil and several other resources.



In this context, the significance of the developing countries had to be redefined. First of all, there was the economic side of the matter. The economy of the developed capitalist powers, in which just under 80 percent of all U.S. overseas direct investments are concentrated, is greatly dependent on the state of affairs in the former colonies, and this means that the profitability of almost 100 billion dollars in American investments also depends on this. Direct U.S. investments in the developing countries (totaling 40 billion dollars by the end of the '970's), the growing trade with them (in 1977 the developing countries accounted for around 43 percent of U.S. foreign trade turnover), and the increasing dependence of the American economy on imports of several necessary raw materials, particularly oil, all testify unequivocally that the United States has begun to depend economically on the developing countries. In its endeavors to gain access to the markets and resources of these countries, to penetrate their economy and to pump huge profits out of them, the United States is not only attaching them to its own economy, but is also falling into definite dependence on them.<sup>10</sup>

The political aspect of the problem is also closely related to this side of the matter. The socioeconomic dependence of the Western European countries on the developing states is posing serious problems for the United States, which hopes to continue playing the leading role in the West. The general international strategic positions of the United States, the possibilities for the global deployment of its military machinery and the degree of its international influence also depend to some extent on the actions of the developing countries. This is why American politicians have had such an abnormal reaction to independent actions by the developing countries in their bilateral relations and in international organizations, and to obvious signs of the growth of the movement for non-alignment and its influence. Despite the fact that the United States maintains extensive commercial contacts with the majority of non-aligned states, on the political level the movement for non-alignment, in which a prominent role is played by such countries as Cuba, Algeria and India, is viewed in Washington as a challenge to American leadership.

In this way, the United States was confronted by the serious problem of the increasing effect of the developing countries on its international positions and, in part, even on internal conditions in the United States. A new factor now entered the process of the elaboration and execution of U.S. global foreign policy strategy--the increasing significance of the developing countries' views had to be taken into account. Attempts to strengthen U.S. international positions and to correct the global balance of power in favor of American imperialism can no longer be undertaken without an eye on the actions of the liberated states, and in view of the many unresolved economic and political conflicts between them and the United States, this new factor is hampering Washington's freedom of action and limiting its possibilities in the international arena.

Therefore, in addition to its previous tasks of fighting against progressive reforms in the developing countries and creating and consolidating "spheres of domination" (in addition to the Latin American countries, U.S. ruling circles would now like to classify the countries of the Near and Middle East as this type of "sphere"), Washington now has to search for ways of coordinating its long-range goals in the developing world with the chief goals of its anti-Soviet and anti-communist global strategy. Its previous approach, consisting in attempts to subordinate the problems of the developing states to the objectives of the struggle against the socialist world, or, in other words, to extend the principles of the

cold war to these regions, is now inapplicable because the developing countries, by their own sovereign actions in defense of their own interests, are not allowing themselves to be treated as an object of U.S. global strategy.

The general reaction of U.S. ruling circles to this situation has been ambiguous. The imperial manner of the leader of the capitalist world, supplemented by obsolete ideas about the degree of American economic independence, has certainly left deep traces in the mentality of the American ruling class, despite the failure of the aggression in Indochina and the changes in the international balance of power. Part of the U.S. ruling class has realized the need to agree to detente and respond positively to the Soviet Union's repeated proposals regarding ways of eliminating the danger of a new world war. Another part of the U.S. ruling class, however, has a strong desire to consolidate its world positions at the expense of the developing countries, using the situation of mutual dependence to bring about changes in the global alignment of forces that will benefit the United States.

Disputes and disagreements between these segments of the business, political and academic communities cover all aspects of American imperialism's interests in the developing countries--social, economic, military-strategic, cultural and ideological. It is not simply the methods of overcoming current difficulties that are being disputed, but the interpretation of major long-range global objectives.

The more active international role of the developing countries, stemming from consciousness--on the government level--dissatisfaction with the nature of their relations with the developed capitalist powers, has demonstrated that present-day capitalism, which is battling the socialist world, is also coming into conflict with the hostile, politically and economically stronger world of the former colonies, which are now presenting their exploiters with a past-due bill. In Washington's view, the most dangerous prospect is the augmentation of the role of countries with a socialist orientation in the developing world and in the movement for non-alignment, the prospect of their quantitative growth and of the choice of the socialist course of development by new states and political parties. The desire to impede this is giving rise to aggressive reaction and attempts to weaken the economies of the progressive countries, undermine their sociopolitical stability and promote reactionary coups and antisocialist transformations. Naturally, the United States prefers to deal with countries with a capitalist orientation, although even these countries have no intention of remaining the submissive exploited segment of the world capitalist economy.

#### Problems and Contradictions

The results of the Carter Administration's 4 years in office in the sphere of relations with the developing states of Asia, Africa and Latin America have received quite negative appraisals within the United States. In spite of repeated promises to continue the North-South dialog, the American Government made every effort to prevent it. As the annual report of the Overseas Development Council states, the Western countries, with the United States in the lead, took on the role of the judge and jury, with the developing countries as the defendant, pleading an "incomprehensible" case.<sup>11</sup> The capitalist world's response to all initiatives set forth by the developing countries in the 1970's was primarily negative, according to other experts. "The North, headed by the United States," R. Hansen wrote, for example, "is still rejecting almost all of the South's proposals, it is not getting

involved in any serious talks, and it quite rarely puts forth any alternative proposals of its own."<sup>12</sup>

We cannot say that people in the U.S. Government do not recognize the gravity and importance of problems in relations with the developing countries. The original staff of the Carter Administration included many individuals who approached these problems with a certain degree of responsibility. There were former Secretary of State C. Vance, former Director of the Agency for International Development J. Gilligan, former U.S. Representative to the United Nations A. Young and some others. They endeavored to assess the significance of the developing countries comprehensively, in relation to U.S. positions in the international arena. Realizing that the resources of the young states, their international influence and their attitude toward the United States were extremely important, they wanted to learn more profound lessons from past mistakes and direct attention to problems which were considered to be undeserving of special attention even in the first half of the 1970's.

"The significance of the developing countries for our national interest, our goals and our own economic prospects," J. Gilligan wrote, for example, in a report to Congress in February 1979, "is becoming simply crucial."<sup>13</sup> In one of his statements on questions of policy in the developing countries (in Seattle in March 1979), former Secretary of State C. Vance called the economic development of these countries a matter of "great importance" to the future of the United States.<sup>14</sup>

Representatives of this group within the administration did not limit themselves to statements about the increased significance of the developing countries. Their speeches also contained constructive proposals: an increase in aid for development needs, as reflected in a 1978 act on international development assistance; the revision of attitudes toward trade with the developing countries; an immeasurably more flexible general U.S. position, full of promise, in this sphere.

It is extremely important to underscore the fact that some members of this group realized the need to seek mutual understanding with the Soviet Union in the resolution of particularly urgent and dangerous international problems directly affecting the interests of the developing countries. Under their influence, the Carter Administration agreed to conduct talks with the USSR on several matters in 1977. A joint Soviet-American statement on the Middle East was drafted, paving the way for a peaceful settlement in this region, with consideration for the interests of all sides. Soviet-American talks on the limitation of military activity in the Indian Ocean were commenced. The first consultations on problems in limiting the international arms trade were held.

The USSR believes that the most urgent and pressing problems of the developing countries cannot be solved in isolation from the general issues of international detente, the limitation of the arms race, and disarmament. The Soviet Government is developing and reinforcing the course of detente and is simultaneously giving the liberated states effective assistance in the resolution of their most urgent and dangerous problems and supporting their efforts in the development sphere. In the United States, on the other hand, some figures in government, particularly in the circles closest to President Carter, have preferred to view Soviet-American talks as a means of strengthening the positions of the United States in relation to the developing countries, and as the USSR's agreement, and just short of its



"obligation," to give the United States an opportunity to force these countries to accept American recipes for the settlement of disputes.

In that same period, summer 1977, the widely publicized North-South talks at the Paris conference on international economic cooperation produced virtually nothing. The U.S. Government began to prepare the soil for the resolute reinforcement of its position in the Middle East, and a presidential directive was drafted and signed in August 1977, calling for the preparation of a "rapid deployment force" for U.S. military operations in the developing countries. In October 1977, immediately after the joint Soviet-American statement on the Middle East had been signed, the U.S. Government supported Sadat's "peace initiative" and the long process of the Camp David talks began, ending in 1979 with the signing of a separate peace treaty by Israel and Egypt.

Washington broke off the talks on the Indian Ocean and stopped the consultations on the limitation of the international arms trade. Cases of selfless international assistance, rendered by the USSR and other socialist states to countries subjected to pressure by imperialism and reaction, evoked an unbalanced response in the White House and were used by it as a pretext for the "critical response" that led to an escalation of international tension.

Washington's departure from the principles of detente and cooperation, its move toward a tough line in Soviet-American relations, its provocative practices and its adventurism did not improve the state of affairs in U.S. relations with the developing countries. On the contrary, people began to wage a more intense struggle against dependent regimes and reactionary dictatorships, and the positions of the United States' allies and partners were weakened even more in the developing countries. The collapse of the shah's regime in Iran and the fall of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua proved that, no matter how abruptly the United States reacted to the infringement of its influence, the alignment of forces in the developing countries would continue to change in a direction contrary to the imperialist interests of the United States. The opposition to the U.S. line in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, which includes a broad variety of political forces--from the national bourgeoisie to progressive groups--is gaining strength and has no intention of abandoning its just and legitimate demands.

The culminating point in the evolution of the Carter Administration's foreign policy line was the President's message to Congress on 23 January 1980, in which he announced a new strategic doctrine, aimed at changing the balance of power in the U.S. favor (this line was later developed and recorded in Directive 59, signed in July 1980). But a prominent place in the President's message was also assigned to the developing countries. Pointing out the growing dependence of the United States and its allies on Middle Eastern oil, the more vehement "demands for change" in the Asian, African and Latin American countries, the revolution in Iran, the "indefinite future" of many other countries (in the spirit of the "crescent of instability" theory), President Carter firmly promised only to organize more military preparations for the suppression of discontent, and the use of the "rapid deployment force," ignoring his previous promises to help the developing countries solve their problems.

This evolution of the administration's policy split its ranks throughout 1979 and 1980. One after another, the resignations of A. Young, J. Gilligan, C. Vance and

other advocates of a more balanced and sober policy line were tendered. Their clashes with the President and his staff involved not only problems in Soviet-U.S. relations but also U.S. policy in the developing countries. Disagreements with the President and his national security adviser over the proper approach to the Middle East, Iran and Africa and over problems in assisting the developing countries played a perceptible role in the disintegration of the unified "Carter team."

But this was not simply a matter of disagreements within the American Government. After all, the policy of the Carter Administration on the threshold of the 1980's and its move toward crude and provocative methods of dealing with virtually all of Washington's partners (with the possible exception of China, in which U.S. ruling circles see a kindred spirit), and sometimes even its allies, have created the most difficult problems primarily for the United States itself. A serious crisis in Southwest Asia, threatening to flare up into a military conflict and endangering oil shipments to Western Europe and Japan--this is essentially what the Carter Administration's foreign policy brought about. What is more, this crisis has not solved a single one of the United States' foreign policy problems, but, on the contrary, has led to the catastrophic propagation of new ones. These are, on the one hand, an impasse in the West's talks with the developing countries on economic matters, the unresolved energy crisis and the threat of a new economic crisis and, on the other, saber-rattling, provocation and escalation of the arms race at a time when the problems of inflation, the trade slump and unemployment are still on the agenda. All of this has not only alienated the President's more cautious followers, but has also cast doubts on the wisdom of his foreign policy in general.

The developing countries, as a whole, have had a negative response to this evolution of Washington's foreign policy line. Their disillusionment with the policy of the Carter Administration turned out to be so deep that virtually all of them had a positive reaction to his defeat in the 1980 election. Although the program of the new President, R. Reagan, in the area of relations with the young states does not contain the tempting prospects held out by the Carter program in 1977, the developing countries are nonetheless hoping for a realistic dialog with the United States under the new administration.

The developmental problems of the liberated states will acquire increasing significance in world economics and politics in the 1980's. It is not simply that the urgent problems of these states must be solved quickly. It will also be necessary to ensure that the accelerated development of the liberated states stimulate the organization of extensive and egalitarian international cooperation in the 1980's and the growth of mutually beneficial trade, and that the resolution of their problems contribute to the processes of detente and cooperation in the interest of all mankind.

The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community sympathize deeply with these problems. The declaration of the Warsaw Pact states, adopted in May 1980 at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, underscores the particular significance of the problems of eliminating discrepancies in the economic development of states and reorganizing international economic relations on a fair and democratic basis.<sup>15</sup>

Questions of economic and social development occupy a prominent place in Soviet relations with the young states. The joint Soviet-Indian declaration, signed on

10 December 1980 during L. I. Brezhnev's stay in India, states: "The Soviet Union and India believe that one of the most important current objectives is the reorganization of international economic relations on a fair and democratic basis and the establishment of a new international economic order. They resolutely condemn all signs of neocolonialism, discrimination and pressure tactics in intergovernmental economic relations."<sup>16</sup>

The U.S. response to these problems, reflected in the evolution of its general global strategy in the direction of flagrant pressure and blackmail tactics, is far from consistent with the realities of the start of the 1980's. It is dictated by nostalgia for the days when imperialism could still ignore the problems of the capitalist world's "periphery" and could hope to consolidate the stability of its world positions by means of threats and shows of strength. Today, however, gunboats, and even aircraft carriers, are no substitute for a responsible approach to the problems of the developing countries and an awareness of the need to settle conflicts, stop the arms race and intensify economic development. Any attempt to use force in the "settlement" of problems in the developing world will certainly rebound in the form of new economic disorders in the Western countries and the escalation of tension in the international arena.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 13.
2. Ibid.
3. See, for example, the annual report (for 1979) of the Overseas Development Council, the largest U.S. organization founded by the business community for comprehensive research into the prospects of relations with the developing countries ("The U.S. and World Development. Agenda for Action, 1979," N.Y., 1979).
4. "U.S. Foreign Policy: Perspectives and Proposals for the 1980's," edited by P. Seabury and A. Wildavsky, N.Y., 1969, pp 17-18.
5. R. Tucker, W. Watts and L. Free, "The U.S. in the World: New Directions for the Post-Vietnam Era?" Wash., 1976, p 3.
6. These ideas were first set forth in an article by Z. Brzezinski in FOREIGN AFFAIRS in 1973 (Z. Brzezinski, "U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1973, pp 722-725); they were then developed in a number of other articles. See, for example, Z. Brzezinski, "The Deceptive Structure of Peace," FOREIGN POLICY, No 14, 1974, pp 39-55.
7. TIME, 15 January 1979, p 6.
8. R. Hansen, "North-South Policy--What's the Problem?" FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1980, p 1104.
9. "The U.S. and World Development. Agenda for Action, 1975," N.Y., 1975, p V.

10. Many official U.S. documents and research papers by American specialists contain references to the mathematical models of world economics developed at the University of Pennsylvania in 1975. According to these models, the economic growth of the developing countries at a rate of 3 percent a year could promote additional growth of 1 percent a year in the economies of the developed capitalist powers (see "Development Issues. U.S. Actions Affecting the Development of Low-Income Countries," The First Annual Report of the Chairman of the Development Coordination Committee Transmitted to the Congress, 1 February 1979, p 7).
11. "U.S. and World Development. Agenda for Action, 1979," p 116.
12. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1980, p 1105.
13. "Development Issues," p 1.
14. "The Secretary of State. America's Commitment to Third World Development," Wash., 30 March 1979, p 1.
15. PRAVDA, 16 May 1980.
16. Ibid., 12 December 1980.

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CSO: 1803

**CHANGES IN U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POSITIONS**

**Moscow SSRA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 pp 15-28**

**[Article by I. Ye. Artem'yev]**

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## UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE. SOME STATISTICS OF THE SEVENTIES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 pp 29-36

[Article by V. B. Naborov]

[Text] Statistics and other data published in the American press in 1980 can serve as the basis for a preliminary appraisal of the results of U.S. foreign trade development in the 1970's and a general assessment of foreign trade's contribution to the attainment of the goals of U.S. economic and political strategy. Between 1970 and 1979, U.S. foreign trade turnover almost quintupled, in current prices, with exports reaching 182 billion dollars, as compared to 43 billion, and imports rising to 206 billion from 40 billion. In the entire preceding decade, the balance of trade was only positive in 1970, 1973 and 1975. The total deficit in trade in the 1970's, including U.S. expenditures on freight and insurance, was 136 billion dollars, whereas there was a constant and sizeable positive balance of trade in the 1960's.<sup>1</sup>

Rising prices in the world markets constitute one of the main reasons for the rapid growth of commodity turnover and for the appearance of a negative balance of trade. Calculated in terms of constant prices, exports rose 79 percent in the 10 years while imports rose 67 percent. The rate of increase in imports was significantly lower than in the previous decade (67 percent as against 124 percent), while that of exports was somewhat higher (79 percent as against 63 percent).

Considerable changes took place in the structure of U.S. foreign trade in the 1970's: Fuel accounted for a higher percentage of imports, and foodstuffs and fodder accounted for a higher percentage of exports. The geographic distribution of foreign trade operations also changed. The developing countries' share of exports and imports grew noticeably. In 1979 they accounted for around 45 percent of U.S. imports, as compared to 26 percent in 1970, and 34 percent of U.S. exports, as compared to 30 percent in 1969. The share of the OPEC countries rose to 20 percent in imports and to 8 percent in exports (4 percent and 4.5 percent respectively in 1970). The share of the developed capitalist countries in U.S. foreign trade as a whole decreased slightly (34 percent of U.S. imports, as compared to 73 percent in 1970, with respective export figures of 63 and 69 percent).

These changes reflect the changes that took place in the entire world economy and in the system of world economic relations in the last decade. The main tendency in the economic development of the capitalist countries in the 1970's was the



deceleration of the economic growth rates of most developed countries and their heightened instability. The development of trade also slowed down in many of these countries. Progress in science and technology, however, contributed to more vigorous activity by multinational corporations, the development of competition between the monopolies of the major capitalist powers and the emergence of a new wave of protectionism. As a result, the interdependence of all participants in international economic relations in the capitalist system became more pronounced. For the United States, this primarily signified a stronger connection between the economic development of the nation and advances in U.S. foreign trade. The strength of this connection is indicated by the considerable growth of the proportions accounted for by exports and imports in the U.S. gross national product, from 4.4 and 4.3 percent respectively in 1970 to 7.7 and 9.3 percent in 1979.<sup>2</sup>

The decade of the 1970's was a period of sharply heightened economic instability for the United States, just as it was for other capitalist countries. In 1970 the United States was already experiencing an economic crisis. Just a few years later, in 1973-1975, the U.S. economy was shaken by a new crisis, and this one, in terms of production decline, was surpassed only by the crisis of 1929-1933. In 1980 the economy suffered from another crisis of overproduction. The relative reduction of the U.S. domestic market as a result of increasing economic instability heightened the interest of many U.S. companies in overseas sales markets and higher export quotas. On the other hand, increasing difficulties in the domestic sales market led to more pronounced protectionist tendencies, and this, in turn, led to the exacerbation of conflicts between the United States and its trade partners.

The 1970's were a period of unrestrained price increases in the United States. In 1979 the inflationary rise in wholesale prices amounted to 12.5 percent. In terms of this indicator, the United States was ahead of its competitors by the end of the decade, and this one of the important factors diminishing its competitive potential and, in the final analysis, one of the important reasons for the large deficit in trade. What is more, whereas Washington devaluated the dollar twice at the beginning of the decade (in 1971 and 1973), which changed its exchange rate and its international positions, the administration lost control over the fluctuations in the exchange rate of American currency in the second half of the 1970's. As a result, its value dropped 20 percent just between June 1976 and December 1979. This reflects the deep-seated disparities in U.S. foreign trade that are exacerbating inter-imperialist conflicts.

American foreign trade positions were also affected negatively by such important features of U.S. economic development in the 1970's as the slower rates of capital accumulation and investment growth, the slow incorporation of new technical achievements and new ideas and delays in the improvement of production technology. These facts were pointed out by Chairman W. Miller of the Federal Reserve System.<sup>3</sup>

The relative weakening of U.S. foreign trade positions faced American ruling circles and the U.S. business community with the problem of the structural reorganization of the economy. Changes in the nation's fuel and energy industry had a considerable effect on U.S. foreign trade positions. During the decade, the degree of U.S. dependence on foreign oil more than doubled. Whereas in 1970 the United States satisfied 21 percent of its demand for oil with imports, the figure was almost 50 percent in 1979. This growing dependence on imports made the United States extremely vulnerable to rising world oil prices.

The growing demand for raw materials, on one side, and the gradual depletion--or deliberate stockpiling--of domestic reserves of several crude minerals, on the other, increased U.S. dependence on imports of several important crude minerals and semimanufactured goods.<sup>4</sup>

Developments in U.S. foreign trade and, in particular, its results in the 1970's had a stronger effect than ever before on several important spheres of economic activity in the nation. Changing conditions in the world capitalist market had an exceptionally strong effect on the U.S. economy through foreign trade. The 1970's were a period of dramatic change in this area as well. The huge deficit in the balance of trade affected the state of the U.S. balance of payments and accelerated the decline of the dollar exchange rate. This, in turn, brought about even more deterioration in the dollar's status as the chief reserve currency and means of payment in international operations. One of the consequences of this devaluation was the accelerated flow of foreign capital into the U.S. economy and the reinforcement of the position of foreign monopolies in several of its branches. Foreign capital investments in the United States totaled 418 billion dollars in 1979 (107 billion in 1970), including 52 billion in direct investments (13 billion in 1970).

Under the conditions of its increased dependence on imported oil, the American economy was severely injured by the numerous increases in the price of oil. This considerably raised the cost of producing many items, particularly in manufacturing processes with high energy requirements. The U.S. firms exporting these items were naturally in a less advantageous position than their European rivals, as they must pay more for imported oil due to the high cost of its shipment across the ocean.

The negative effect of rising expenditures on imported oil caused the U.S. Government to list the reduction of dependence on imported oil among its chief economic priorities. Some of the measures taken by the administration in the energy sphere benefited American exporters. For example, the oil and gas price controls instituted by the Nixon and Ford administrations gave American exporters a price advantage, estimated at 10 percent by U.S. economists and at 15-30 percent, depending on the commodity, by Western European economists. As a result, the United States was able to dramatically increase exports of synthetic fibers and other commodities based on petrochemicals. For example, exports of synthetic fibers, mainly to England and Italy, totaled 200 million dollars just in the first half of 1979, as compared to 20 million for the entire year of 1977.<sup>5</sup>

Many of these factors increased consumer demand for imports. The demand for compact automobiles, for example, increased. As a result, 26 percent of all the passenger cars in the U.S. domestic market in 1979 were foreign models, with Japanese cars making up 13 percent. In some branches of American industry, the rapid increase in imports had extremely grave consequences and led to the loss of jobs and widespread unemployment.

Foreign trade is a sphere in which the process by which U.S. monopolistic capital is losing its leading position in the capitalist economic system is most distinctly reflected. In 1979 the U.S. share of world capitalist exports fell to 12 percent, from a figure of 15 percent in 1970, and the United States had to give up its leading position to the FRG in world exports of industrial commodities.

The onslaught of the large capitalist countries on U.S. positions in international trade heightened competition in markets and exacerbated trade and political conflicts. These conflicts became particularly acute in connection with the increased expansion of West German and Japanese metallurgical concerns in the U.S. market. Conflicts were also exacerbated over the consequences of the American dollar's devaluation for Western Europe and Japan, and over aspects of the general economic policy of these countries, which are having a negative effect on American exports.

The United States regards measures to broaden American companies' access to foreign markets as one of the chief means of strengthening its leading position in the capitalist world. In the 1970's, Washington concentrated on eliminating non-tariff barriers restricting exports. On its initiative, the GATT conducted its seventh set of trade negotiations (the "Tokyo round") in 1974-1979, during the course of which non-tariff restrictions of trade were discussed along with the reduction of customs duties. As a result of these talks, agreements were signed, in an atmosphere of heated disputes, on the reduction of customs duties by an average of 33 percent in the next 8 years, as well as nine agreements on non-tariff barriers--on export subsidies and compensatory duties; on protective measures envisaging temporary import restrictions; on technical barriers (or standards); on government purchases; on licensing; on customs appraisals of imported goods; on commercial practices; on aircraft trade; on the improvement of international trade conditions.

According to American economists, these agreements will have a favorable effect on the state of the U.S. economy and will help to consolidate the positions of U.S. companies. It has been calculated, for example, that the agreements will raise the average annual rate of industrial production growth by 1.1 percentage points and the number of employed by 424,000 between 1985 and 1990. Besides this, the results of the talks will have a positive effect on the state of the U.S. balance of foreign trade.<sup>6</sup> American exporters expect the GATT decisions to simplify access to foreign markets for American agricultural goods and reduce the use of non-tariff barriers by America's rivals to restrict U.S. imports.

Nevertheless, while the American administration was promoting the conclusion of these agreements, which will be of general benefit to the United States, it had to make several concessions to its trade partners. In particular, in view of the fact that the agreement on the reduction of duties applies to U.S. duties as well, more competition from foreign goods can be expected in the American market in coming years. The United States also had to agree to some changes in the procedure for the imposition of compensatory duties on foreign goods and to the cancellation of preferential terms for national suppliers in transactions involving government purchases.

When we assess the significance of the GATT agreements, we must say that they afford extremely broad possibilities for the further use of forms of non-tariff protectionism, not covered by the agreements, by the United States and by other capitalist countries, and they do not provide any safeguards against the appearance of new forms. For example, the "voluntary export limits," instituted by other countries under U.S. pressure, are still in effect, and broader subsidization is offered to American companies threatened by increasing competition on the part of foreign firms, whose access to the American market has been simplified by the



reduction of U.S. customs duties. On the whole, however, agreements like the ones concluded as a result of the "Tokyo round" cannot stop the development of centrifugal forces in the capitalist world or the changes in the balance of power between the chief imperialist rivals to the disadvantage of the United States.<sup>7</sup>

The increased dependence of the U.S. economy on foreign trade has affected U.S. relations with the developing countries. In 1979, more than 26 percent of all U.S. exports went to these countries, excluding the oil-producing states. The sales volume of U.S. goods in these countries more than doubled between 1973 and 1979, and imports tripled.

In the mid-1970's, when problems in the world trade in raw materials were exacerbated, the United States' vulnerability in the area of raw material supplies from the developing countries became quite apparent. These countries provide the U.S. economy with much of its raw materials (85 percent of its tin, 93 percent of its bauxite and 40 percent of its oil). In the sphere of oil shipments from abroad, the United States depends most on Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Libya and Venezuela. The interests of the United States as an oil importer have a definite effect on the government's position in relations with traditional suppliers of oil, as Iran was, for example, and in relations with prospective suppliers, such as Mexico.

In recent years, the developing countries have also played a much more important role as sales markets for American goods. Their share of the American processing industry's exports exceeded 25 percent, and they accounted for 80 percent of the rice exported by the United States, 45 percent of the cotton and 50 percent of the wheat. According to the calculations of government economists, the future of 800,000 jobs depends, directly or indirectly, on exports to the developing states. At the same time, the United States' position as the major supplier of food to the developing countries will allow it to use its foreign trade policy as an instrument of economic pressure.

The intensive struggle of these countries against neocolonialism is of tremendous significance in U.S. foreign trade policymaking. The 1970's were the decade when the developing countries issued a demand to the United States and the entire Western world for the reorganization of international economic relations on a fair and equal basis and called for a new international economic order. The just demands of these countries were supported by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In these years, the developing countries united their efforts for the first time to protect their interests in world raw material markets. Some of them are now actively expanding their industrial exports to the United States.

Under these conditions, H. Kissinger, the Nixon Administration's secretary of state, proposed a new approach to economic relations with the developing countries. The U.S. Government moved from a frankly negative response to their demands in the area of international trade to ostensibly positive statements, and it even began to set forth initiatives, supposedly aimed at the resolution of the developing states' economic problems. In fact, however, the United States is still adhering to its line of neocolonialism and of strengthening the positions of American private capital in these countries to the maximum.

This is illustrated by the example of the American delegation's statement at the fourth UNCTAD session in Nairobi (May 1976), proposing the creation of an

international resource bank. This initiative was actually aimed at the establishment of favorable conditions for U.S. private capital in the exploitation of the raw materials of the developing countries. This colonial purpose of the American proposal was so evident to conference participants that a resolution on this matter was not even put to a vote. The latest example of American demagoguery in economic policy toward the developing countries was the widely publicized allocation of 4.5 million tons of grain by the U.S. Government in April 1980 for the purpose of "food assistance" for these countries through the International Food Assistance Convention. In essence, this move was not any kind of departure from Washington's years-old policy of selling agricultural surplus in the developing countries, conducted for the attainment of U.S. economic and political goals and regulated by the notorious "Act 480." The new program does not envisage any extra quantities of foodstuffs in addition to those allocated each year in accordance with this law. As for the terms of food shipments, in recent years there has been a tendency to reduce shipments of grain on preferential terms during the very seasons when there is a shortage of food in the market and prices go up. It is during these unfavorable seasons for the developing countries that the United States reduces its food assistance and increases commercial sales abroad.

In recent years, the United States has verbally revised its attitude toward the question of participation in international trade agreements aimed at stabilizing world raw material prices. An examination of past and present approaches to the matter clearly indicates, however, that there has been virtually no change in the U.S. stand on the problem of raw material price stabilization. In the past, the government announced that the United States would not participate in such agreements, with the exception of those that would guarantee it certain advantages. Now, on the other hand, it is stating that the United States will participate in all agreements, with the exception of those that put it at a disadvantage. The result of this change in wording was U.S. participation in the international sugar agreement in 1977 and the reserve conservation program envisaged in the international tin agreement in 1979. Neither agreement has a regulating effect on the market at present. It is true, however, that the change in U.S. feelings about the idea of raw material market stabilization resulted logically in a forced departure from the negative U.S. attitude toward the creation of a general UN fund to finance international raw material reserves for the purpose of price stabilization.

In 1979, then Secretary of State C. Vance announced that U.S. policy toward the countries of the developing world would henceforth be based on a recognition of the strong connection between the state of the U.S. economy and the state of affairs in these countries. The United States has also made announcements about the increasing importance of the developing countries in the safeguarding of U.S. "security" and foreign policy interests. In fact, however, the U.S. administration has taken up the policy of actively involving these countries in the system of international capitalist relations as "equal partners," and not as countries with differing advantages and privileges. It has begun to insist, for example, that these countries compensate, at least partially, for the customs exemptions they acquired as a result of GATT talks by instituting a reciprocal reduction in duties and gradually giving up their export subsidies. As a result of the "Tokyo round," the United States has already concluded agreements with some developing states, envisaging tariff exemptions for the United States in the form of compensation for U.S. tariff concessions, as well as the observance of certain export subsidization regulations by the developing countries. In addition, the United States proposed

that these countries agree to assume the responsibility for some of their moves in the sphere of international economic relations, particularly for the consequences of oil price increases.

In the 1970's the interdependence of U.S. foreign trade activity and foreign policy became quite apparent. The growth of this interdependence was attested to, on the one hand, by the sharp increase in American sales of weapons and other military equipment, intended for the support of regimes to the liking of the United States, and, on the other, by the broader use of trade and political instruments in the attainment of foreign policy goals, primarily in relations with the socialist countries. Between 1970 and 1979, U.S. military shipments abroad more than tripled. It is important to note that the terms of U.S. weapon and military equipment deliveries changed in the 1970's. Whereas in 1970 most of these shipments were envisaged in defense aid programs, now most of them are commercial sales.<sup>8</sup>

The use of foreign trade as an instrument for the attainment of U.S. foreign policy goals was clearly demonstrated in the evolution of Washington's line in relations with the socialist countries. Under the conditions of international detente in the 1970's, the United States reached agreements with the Soviet Union on several important issues. In 1972, the U.S. Government concluded a trade agreement with the USSR, envisaging, in particular, the mutual granting of most-favored-nation status, and worked toward the creation of normal conditions for the crediting of exports to the Soviet Union. These actions created a favorable atmosphere for the development of trade relations. Between 1970 and 1976, Soviet-American trade turnover grew 14-fold. The possibilities for the development of trade were only partially utilized, however, and only for a short time. At the end of 1974, U.S. ruling circles began to make extensive use of trade and political instruments to undermine detente.<sup>9</sup> In the beginning of the 1980's, Washington used the events in Afghanistan and the transfer of a limited contingent of Soviet troops to that country as an excuse to institute trade sanctions against the USSR, which inflicted economic losses on the United States itself, particularly the American farmers. In connection with this, *TARIFFS AND TRADE* reported: "The economic sanctions against the USSR could have important consequences if Europe and Japan seriously limit their exports. But they will not do this because, just as in the case of Iran, the stakes are too high for them in the sphere of trade. Europe and Japan earn billions of dollars a year in business with the Soviets and, to a certain degree, depend on Soviet oil and gas."<sup>10</sup>

The increased use of foreign trade for political purposes can also be traced in changes in the U.S. line in relations with the PRC. When the United States granted China most-favored-nation status in trade and shipping, this played an important cementing role in the construction of the American-Chinese anti-Soviet alliance. On the Chinese side, the economic platform of the American-Chinese bargain is reinforced by a policy giving American corporations access to the exploitation of Chinese natural resources. In July 1979, a law was passed in the PRC to permit foreign capital investments in the economy. For American corporations, this means that they will have an opportunity to participate in the exploitation of China's oil resources and in the working of deposits of raw materials in short supply in the United States. Off-shore drilling in the South China Sea was already being negotiated in 1979 by such major oil concerns as Exxon, Texaco, Atlantic Richfield and Union Oil.<sup>11</sup> There is no question that the restoration of trade and economic



relations with the PRC on these terms is aimed at, in addition to purely political goals, the resolution of several vitally important domestic economic problems in the United States.<sup>12</sup>

One of the most characteristic examples of the United States' use of foreign trade for political purposes is the trade blockade of Iran, which was established, in particular, to demonstrate Washington's support of regimes loyal to American capital and to intimidate the political forces abroad that have resolved to oppose American expansion.

This examination of some American foreign trade statistics testifies that, in the 1970's, trade with foreign states became one of the key factors in Washington's search for solutions to several major economic and political problems, and that this trade played a more important role in relations between the United States and its Western partners, in the exploitation of the developing countries and in the policy of anti-Sovietism.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. All of the data on U.S. foreign trade have been calculated according to information in "Highlights of U.S. Export and Import Trade," Wash., December 1970, December 1979; "Statistical Abstract of the United States," 1979.
2. Calculated according to the "Economic Report of the President, January 1980," Wash., 1980.
3. W. Miller, "The Role of Productivity Gains in Solving National Economic Problems," VOICE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, December 1978, p 3.
4. For more detail, see Ye. N. Kondrashov, "Assessing U.S. Ore Potential" (No 10, 1980)--Editor's note.
5. TARIFFS AND TRADE, 23 October 1979.
6. "World Economic Outlook, National Chamber Forecast and Survey Center," May 1979, p 15.
7. The results of these talks are discussed in detail in the article by A. A. Smirnova, "The 'Tokyo Round' and the United States" (No 8, 1979)--Editor's note.
8. These matters are analyzed in depth in the article by A. V. Kozyrev, "The Arms Trade as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy" (No 5, 1980)--Editor's note.
9. See the article by V. A. Yulin, "The Policy of 'Conditional Flexibility' in Trade with the USSR" (No 6, 1980)--Editor's note.
10. TARIFFS AND TRADE, 22 January 1980.
11. THE WASHINGTON POST, 2 June 1979.
12. American-Chinese trade and economic relations are discussed in detail in the survey by A. B. Parkanskiy and A. A. Nagornyy in No 12 for 1979--Editor's note.

**THE AFL-CIO AND THE ADMINISTRATION**

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**[Article by G. D. Gevorgyan]**

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THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT, 1980

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[Article by Yu. P. Averkiyeva]

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## THE 'ROGERS PLAN' FOR THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

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[Article by V. A. Shmarov]

[Text] Greece's return to the military organization of the NATO bloc, announced by Prime Minister G. Rallis in October 1980, has heightened the instability in the East Mediterranean connected with the unresolved Cyprus problem and the group of Greek-Turkish conflicts. The "Rogers formula" (the supreme allied commander of European NATO forces), which served as the basis for Greece's step, did not eliminate a single one of the reasons for its withdrawal from the organization in 1974 to protest NATO's inability to protect Greece's interests in its conflict with neighboring Turkey over Cyprus and a number of territorial disputes. The "Rogers Plan" envisages immediate participation by Greece in the NATO military organization and postpones the resolution of all problems until "a later time." At "a later time," a special allied military commission is supposed to settle disagreements regarding the distribution of operational obligations between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea, although Greece has already agreed to reduce its national waters in this zone from 16 kilometers to 10. Questions about the Pentagon's military bases in Greece have not been settled either. The talks on this issue have been going on since last December in Athens.

Greece's decision to return to the North Atlantic bloc's military organization marks the end of the latest stage in its foreign policy, which has been distinguished by a gradual yielding to NATO and U.S. pressure since the unipartite bourgeois government of the New Democracy party took power in November 1974.

Greece's withdrawal from the NATO military organization primarily affected the United States, the only member of the bloc with military bases and various facilities in Greece. This is why the government's move toward the liquidation of foreign military facilities raised questions about the nature and prospects of U.S.-Greek relations. In April 1975, an American-Greek communique was signed on the dismantling of two U.S. military bases--the 6th Navy's moorage in Eleusis, from which around 2,000 sailors were withdrawn, and the airfield in Ellinikon. All other facilities, as stated in the document, were put under "national Greek control."

The loss of the facilities in Greece aroused serious concern in Washington and in Western European NATO circles. Despite their disagreement on some issues, the United States and Western Europe agreed that Athens' demarche would undermine the

bonds of "Atlantic solidarity" and that the disintegrated southeastern flank of NATO represented a dangerous gap in "Western defense." This is why the Greek government encountered pressure from many sides.

The pressure of the NATO strategists became particularly persistent in connection with the discussion of Greece's prospective membership in the EEC. The NATO leadership used Greece's wish to quickly join the EEC as a full-fledged member (it became one in January 1981) as a pretext for even more pressure, making this matter directly conditional upon Greece's return to the bloc's military organization.

The pressure exerted on the Greek government worked, and Greece, yielding step by step, agreed to the formula of a "special relationship" with the North Atlantic Alliance. In 1976 this formula assumed the following: "The Greek Armed Forces will continue to play their role in Western defense, under national control in peacetime and at the disposal of the NATO command for the purposes of 'full military cooperation' during periods of 'general armed conflict'; during the conduct of NATO combat maneuvers, the Greek government will determine the degree of participation by its armed forces; the Greek Army will maintain constant contact with the NATO command; the territory and waters of Greece can be used for maneuvers, but only with the special permission of the government; NATO nuclear weapons will remain within Greek territory; the system of telecommunications and radar stations will remain under NATO control."

But even this formula, which essentially signified the almost total reinstatement of Greece as a member in the NATO military organization, did not please the bloc command completely; it was irritated by the words "by agreement," "with the permission" and "with the consent," which, in the event of new complications in relations with Greece, could impede certain actions. For this reason, it continued its pressure campaign to reword the formula of the "special relationship," hoping to gain more reliable guarantees.

Athens insisted, however, that this formula remain slightly different from the formula of full membership in NATO, to justify it to the Greek public and create the semblance of the partial fulfillment of previously assumed commitments. As a result, the formula of the "special relationship" was updated in 1978, in a version agreed upon by General A. Haig, then supreme allied commander of European NATO forces, and General I. Davos, chief of the General Staff of the Greek Armed Forces. It was called the "Haig-Davos formula." In accordance with this, two Greek conditions were adopted, which essentially did not affect NATO interests and were of a formal nature: The first was that the Greek Armed Forces would be under national command in peacetime, and the second was that a new command headquarters would be set up in a Greek city, with Greek officers in charge. In exchange for this, Greece agreed to participate in all NATO military undertakings, its exercises and maneuvers, and to allow its land, air space and territorial waters to be used for this purpose. Therefore, the "Haig-Davos formula" signified Greece's virtually complete return to the NATO military organization.

Turkey kept an eye on these talks. In connection with the plan to set up a new headquarters, it proposed the division of the zones of responsibility of the Izmir and Larisa commands prior to the ratification of the "special relationship"



formula. The proposal touched a "sore spot" in the complex of Greek-Turkish conflicts in the Aegean Sea. The two neighboring countries have long been fighting a fierce battle over rights to the territorial waters, air space and continental shelf of the Aegean basin. Political groups in Athens reacted quickly and quite harshly to the Turkish proposal, asserting that Greece did not even want to discuss a return to NATO on Turkish terms. Refusing to take part in a dialog with Turkey, the Greek government turned directly to NATO and the United States, asking them to reason with its neighbor. Otherwise, political groups in Athens suggested, Greece would leave NATO altogether and close down all American facilities.

The NATO people began to worry. New consultations were held, but Greek-Turkish intransigence prevented a compromise.

The signing of the U.S.-Greek agreement on "cooperation in the area of defense," initialed on 28 July 1977, was postponed for a time. According to this agreement, the status of U.S. military bases was defined in exchange for the offer of 700 million dollars in military aid to Greece. The Greek government was in no hurry to sign the agreement. In the first place, it had to take the tremendous opposition to the treaty within the nation into account and, in the second place, it did not want to let go of an effective instrument for bargaining with the United States. Besides this, people in Athens were waiting to see the outcome of similar talks by Washington and Ankara. This would give the Greek side an opportunity to determine if any of the provisions in the U.S.-Turkish treaty would be inconvenient for Greece, in which case Greece could demand that Washington make corresponding changes in the U.S.-Greek document.

Washington, on the other hand, was in a hurry: The revolutionary events in Afghanistan and Iran "demanded" that affairs in the East Mediterranean be put in order as quickly as possible, and the "Carter Doctrine," announced near the end of the Democratic Administration's stay in the White House, turned these demands into regional political imperatives. In addition, in an election year the Washington politicians could not act without keeping an eye on the reaction of the Greek community in the United States (2 million people).<sup>1</sup>

There was also another factor influencing Washington's position. Although the Greek government had severed its military ties to NATO, it constantly stressed that Greece was part of the Western world. C. Karamanlis clarified this by explaining that Greece's decision did "not mean that it will sever its political and spiritual bonds with Western Europe, to which it belongs and wants to belong." The "Greece belongs to the West" thesis led to much more active bilateral relations with the Western European states. Washington had an extremely sensitive reaction to Greek attempts to converge with "Europeanist" circles, particularly in France, on the basis of opposition to NATO pressure and blackmail. France proposed that Greece be accepted as a member of the Common Market, viewing this as a way of strengthening "Europeanism." The issue involving Athens' return to the NATO military organization required the kind of tactical line that would aid in establishing favorable prerequisites for stronger influence and a more important role in the Eastern

1. Incidentally, the election defeat suffered by Congressman J. Brademas, who headed the Greek lobby on Capitol Hill, was interpreted by American analysts as an expression of dissatisfaction with Carter's policy by the Greek-Americans.



Mediterranean for the Western European states that regard the North Atlantic alliance as a "security guarantor" and are advocating its reinforcement. Washington tried to transfer the group of Greek-Turkish conflicts from the political sphere to the level of military strategy. The purpose of this tactic was to impose a "restoration" of the bloc's southeastern flank, with a rigid form and a militaristic essence, on Greece and Turkey. The implementation of this tactical line was assigned to American General B. Rogers, who had succeeded General A. Haig as supreme allied commander of European NATO forces in July 1979.

After a series of consultations, Rogers proposed a plan which reflected the maximalist approach of NATO strategists to the Aegean basin. It specified that Greece and Turkey would each control half of the air space over the Aegean Sea, that Athens would defend the coastline of continental Greece and the Northern Sporades and Cyclades, and that Ankara would oversee the coastline of continental Turkey. According to Rogers' plan, the United States would serve as the "regulating force" and would exercise military control over the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Icaria and Rhodes. For the purpose of better operational control in this zone, the Rogers plan envisaged the enlargement of the American garrison there and the augmentation of its staff to 9,000 men. In other words, "insular" presence was added to the Pentagon's continental military presence. For militaristic preparations, remote and isolated locations were given preference.

The islands in the Aegean Sea may be quite small individually, but they are scattered over a sizeable area. Their ridge not only separates Greece from Turkey, but is also in direct proximity to the countries of the Near East, the southern border of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. What is more, it is located in an important region for world shipping. But the "insular strategy" variation was not accepted. The Greek government felt that this redistribution of operational control in the Aegean was unacceptable and, as its official reply stated, "incompatible with Greece's sovereign rights." Athens left the door open, however, for further bargaining, making Greece's participation in NATO military operations conditional upon Ankara's consent to the 1974 distribution of zones of control in the Aegean Sea.

According to NOUVELLES ATLANTIQUE, Rogers submitted a report to NATO Secretary General J. Luns, in which he admitted the failure of his mission.

The Atlantic strategists did not discard their new tactic, however, but simply added a few tried and tested elements to it. In particular, they resorted to the use of Greek-Turkish competition for military and economic aid. For fiscal year 1981, the United States allocated Greece only 184 million dollars, but it offered Turkey 252 million for military needs and 200 million in economic aid. This latest injection of dollars demonstrated that Washington, ignoring its previously declared principle of "equal interest" in the East Mediterranean, had chosen Turkey as the "key" ally in this region, apparently hoping to thereby force Greece to make concessions and seek compromises. On 29 March 1980, a U.S.-Turkish treaty on military and economic cooperation was signed in Ankara, envisaging the offer of additional military bases to the Pentagon in exchange for financial assistance.

Another component of the pressure mechanism was the policy of the Western European NATO countries, which also gave priority to Turkey. For example, the FRG offered

Ankara special military aid in the amount of 353 million dollars, while Athens was offered only 35 million.

Rightist bourgeois circles in Greece gave in. They agreed to return to the NATO military organization on the basis of the updated "Rogers Plan." Displaying rare caution, the NATO supreme allied commander began intensive consultations with the heads of the Greek and Turkish military establishments. The recently heightened military strategic value of the Eastern Mediterranean in imperialist policy, particularly in connection with the radical changes in the Middle East and the Iran-Iraq conflict, motivated Washington to make every effort to "repair" NATO's southeastern flank as quickly as possible and to settle Greek-Turkish conflicts. At the same time, as the TIMES of London noted, "the drafting of the agreement on Greece's return to the NATO military organization was indisputably simplified by the military coup in Turkey and by the fact that the military leadership of this country places so much importance on its NATO obligations."

The final "Rogers Plan" is not simply the result of compromises forced on two conflicting neighbors, but the result of coordinated, concerted action by NATO and U.S. imperialists who view the East Mediterranean as an outpost for the attainment of expansionist objectives far from the boundaries of this zone, including objectives in the Persian Gulf and the Pacific basin. The restoration of NATO's southeastern flank and the functioning of Pentagon bases in Greece and Turkey are connected, judging by all indications, with practical plans to broaden NATO's sphere of activity in the Middle East and the concrete steps toward the use of "rapid deployment" forces.

France's QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS described the restoration of NATO's southeastern flank and related military undertakings as a "double victory," made possible by the stubborn exertion of pressure on Athens and Ankara by Washington and NATO leaders, which, on the one hand, "will strengthen NATO's southern flank considerably" and, on the other, "will give Western security priority over regional politics."

Greece's return to the NATO military structure will harm its national interests. The Rogers plan will involve this country in imperialism's dangerous adventures and envisages further concessions on Athens' part in questions of sovereign rights to the use of territorial waters, air and land. It envisages the storage and deployment of new nuclear missiles and active Greek involvement in the arms race. It is no wonder that the adoption of the "Rogers Plan" aroused stormy indignation and protest in the general public in Greece, Cyprus and other neighboring states.

Judging by reports in the Western press, General Rogers is being applauded in NATO circles. It appears, however, that they have no substantial grounds for optimism. The Greek-Turkish conflicts have not been resolved, and the national interests of countries in this region are still profoundly incompatible with the imperialist goals of the United States and NATO, which have already seriously eroded their positions in the East Mediterranean.

The "Rogers Plan" is an offspring of the policy of escalating international tension, a throwback to cold war methods, the first actions of which were taken precisely in the East Mediterranean. The rebirth of this policy is disturbing and alarming all peaceful forces. Recent history proves conclusively that mankind has

only one reasonable course in the development of international relations. This is the course of political dialog, the continuation of the process of detente, the curtailment of the arms race and the development of international cooperation.

Constantly guided by these principles, the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist community propose that the question of limiting and reducing the level of military presence and military activity in all areas, including the Mediterranean, be discussed, perhaps within the UN framework. In their May (1980) declaration, the Warsaw Pact states announced: "In the Mediterranean, the steps toward this goal could include the extension of security measures to this zone, the reduction of armed forces in the region, the removal of naval ships carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean Sea, and the refusal to deploy nuclear weapons within the territory of the Mediterranean European and non-European non-nuclear countries, which would be consistent with the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act." This program of action was reaffirmed in the Soviet Union's memorandum "For Peace and Disarmament, for Guarantees of International Security," submitted to the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly. Its implementation would be in the interest of the reliable and uninterrupted use of major international sea lanes and in the interest of peace and international security.

The "Rogers Plan" is contrary to these interests.

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**'HARPERS' MISADVENTURES**

**Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 pp 64-65**

**[Article by A. B. Pankin]**

**[Not translated by JPRS]**

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UNITED STATES POPULATION: SOME RESULTS OF THE 1980 COUNT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 pp 66-77

[Article by Ye. D. Mikhaylov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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CONGRESS AND NATURE. THE DECADE OF LOST OPPORTUNITIES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 pp 78-82

[Article by N. A. Shvedova]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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## WHO HAMBERS DETENTE IN EUROPE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 pp 83-86

[Article by Ye. S. Lavrov]

[Text] The U.S. mass media are giving considerable coverage to the Madrid meeting of the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which has resumed its work after a 1-month break.

Washington's move at the turn of the decade toward the escalation of tension in international relations considerably affected the American stand on questions of security and cooperation in Europe, as well as the general tone of statements in the American press about this complex of problems during the period of preparations for the Madrid meeting.<sup>1</sup> This turnabout was "celebrated" by such anti-detente actions by the U.S. Government, contrary to the spirit and letter of the Helsinki agreements, as the adoption of a long-range military program within the NATO framework, the imposition of a decision on the United States' Western European partners in this bloc regarding the deployment of new medium-range U.S. missiles on their territory, the signing of Presidential Directive 59, "substantiating" the possibility of "limited nuclear war" against the USSR, the unprecedented growth of military expenditures, the delays in the ratification of the SALT II treaty, and U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of other states by means of blackmail, authoritarianism and military force. Anti-Soviet, antisocialist statements, filled with slander and lies, have been a constant feature of reports by the U.S. mass media.

American propaganda used the notorious "Afghan question" as a pretext to justify the administration's destructive stand on detente in 1980. Speculating on the fact that the Soviet Union has given the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan all-round assistance, including military aid, the mass media in the United States and a number of other Western countries have launched another anti-Soviet campaign. One of the most popular theses of this campaign is the allegation that the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan "was clearly in violation of the principles of the Helsinki agreement."<sup>2</sup> In reality, the decision to send a limited contingent of Soviet armed forces to the territory of the DRA was made in complete accordance with the principles of international law, and the provisions of the Final Act do not limit the rights and obligations of states as specified in existing treaties and agreements.

This campaign achieved such huge proportions that some American politicians called for a boycott of the Madrid meeting, and NEW YORK TIMES correspondent W. Safire went so far as to advise the Carter Administration to "abrogate the Helsinki agreement."<sup>3</sup>

In connection with the rumors spread by the press regarding the postponement or cancellation of the Madrid meeting, the State Department had to explain its position. The administration "is striving to leave the possibility open that a conference might take place in Madrid this fall to discuss the Helsinki agreements of 1975,"<sup>4</sup> the assistant secretary of state for European affairs declared. At the same time, Under Secretary M. Nimetz stressed that the United States should continue to be represented at meetings of the participants in the all-Europe conference, as this "would represent conclusive recognition of the fact that the United States will play an important role in Europe's future."<sup>5</sup>

American diplomacy, speaking in favor of the Madrid meeting, had an extremely specific interpretation of its objectives. The main objective--and this was reflected in articles in the American press--was to promote the idea that the chief, if not the only, purpose of the meeting in the Spanish capital would be a review of the socialist countries' compliance with the Final Act, with the emphasis on the "Afghan question" and the far-fetched issue of "human rights."<sup>6</sup> Not long before the start of the Madrid conference, appeals were printed in the U.S. press for a discussion of the so-called "Polish question" in Madrid, which would signify direct intervention in the internal affairs of Poland. For example, S. Rosenfeld issued a warning in the WASHINGTON POST: "The United States will appear indifferent if it does not use the coming conference on the fulfillment of the Helsinki agreement to speak out in defense of the Poles."<sup>7</sup>

As articles in the American press about the Madrid meeting indicated, the tough line of the United States was reinforced by the Carter Administration's negative reaction to the constructive initiatives of the states of the socialist community, aimed at improving the European and international political climate, strengthening the process of detente in Europe and making progress in the area of military detente. Noting that "the goal of American strategy is the failure of communist bloc proposals," WASHINGTON POST correspondent J. Goshko wrote that "American officials have responded with unconcealed hostility to the Soviet appeals"<sup>8</sup> (referring to the proposal of the Warsaw Pact states that a decision be adopted at the Madrid meeting on a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe--Ye. L.). This view was indirectly confirmed by Secretary of State E. Muskie at the end of July 1980.<sup>9</sup> For the purpose of a broader propaganda campaign against the socialist countries during the course of the meeting, U.S. representatives ignored the agreement reached by all participants regarding the confidential nature of the sessions and vigorously publicized its slanderous lies in the Western mass media.

The obstructionist nature of the U.S. line in Madrid seriously disturbed the progressive American public. The DAILY WORLD of 8 November 1980 reported that the United States had become one of the chief obstacles in the way of stronger international detente. By insisting on a discussion of the so-called "human rights issue" in Madrid--this issue that was used by the White House for intervention in the internal affairs of foreign states--the United States, the DAILY WORLD noted,



is striving to undermine the actual purpose of the Madrid meeting. According to PEOPLE'S WORLD, the unconstructive nature of the U.S. position at the meeting is directly related to its desire to prevent the discussion of the specific steps that must be taken in the near future to ensure military detente and disarmament in Europe.

According to reports in the U.S. press, the objectives set for American representatives in Madrid are to be attained by means of the proper balancing of forces in the delegation. The Carter Administration's former attorney general, G. Bell, was appointed head of the delegation. Bell is known as "Carter's man" and as one of the initiators of the "human rights" campaign (it is indicative, however, that after resigning from the office of attorney general in July 1979, Bell was sued by several civil rights organizations in the United States).<sup>10</sup> His deputy, M. Kampelman, was one of the leaders of the Committee on the Present Danger, which is closely connected with the military-industrial complex. He is also described in the press as a personal friend of Carter's. The delegation included members of the Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which had assumed the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the socialist states and which "generated" all sorts of lies about the process of European detente. In addition, according to reports in American newspapers, the delegation included so-called "public spokesmen," mainly representing anti-Soviet and antisocialist emigrant groups in the United States.

"Professional" opponents of detente, whose very existence depends on the preservation of tension and confrontation, and dissidents, who were deported from the socialist states for illegal actions hostile to the socialist order and who found a refuge in the West, joined in the "psychological warfare" against the Madrid meeting. They filled the press with the most malicious attacks on the Soviet Union and detente, and the most gloomy prophecies about the Madrid meeting.

The U.S. line of confrontation with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community at the Madrid meeting disturbed sensible politicians in the majority of the Western European states, including the United States' NATO partners. "The allies are making more frequent private and public admissions of their worries that the United States might compel them to take the line of unyielding confrontation with the Soviet bloc over the issue of human rights in Madrid. This will have serious negative consequences in other areas of East-West relations, which are much more important to the Europeans than to the United States,"<sup>11</sup> FOREIGN POLICY remarked in this connection. "The Western European countries," the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR admitted, "would like to concentrate on preparations for talks on the consolidation of security, and not on bombastic speeches about human rights."<sup>12</sup> For a long time, American diplomacy was extremely cool in its response to the initiatives of France and other Western European countries. On 11 December 1980, the TIMES of London remarked that the conference on military detente, in the opinion of the Americans, "could detract from future conferences on the fulfillment of the Helsinki agreement."

The considerable differences in the views of the United States and the Western European states on the purpose and nature of the Madrid meeting complicated the Carter Administration's plans to use it for an "all-out diplomatic assault on the Soviet Union." American diplomacy had to make partial changes in its policy and

make certain concessions to the allies to avoid isolation. As A. Shirer wrote in this connection, "if Washington persists in trying to smother this process, the Europeans might try to resurrect it without U.S. participation."<sup>13</sup> "The need to support France, which has the European Economic Community on its side, might force the United States to agree to any type of conference on military matters,"<sup>14</sup> the WASHINGTON POST also remarked.

Although they have formally agreed with the allies that a conference on disarmament in Europe must be convened, the Americans have continued to shift positions, first arguing the "need for thorough consideration of the French proposals," then discussing the "need for balanced debate," and then speaking about the "potential difficulties created for U.S. security by the proposal on post-Madrid meetings."<sup>15</sup> This concealed the reluctance of U.S. ruling circles to take any real steps to diminish military tension and achieve disarmament in Europe, particularly in the nuclear sphere.

Explaining that the position of the American delegation was influenced by several domestic political factors, particularly the consideration that U.S. President J. Carter had made the matter of "human rights" one of the main issues of his campaign, the DAILY TELEGRAPH reported: "Progress in the area of human rights would be of tremendous value to Carter in an election year, as he had made human rights the cornerstone of his presidency from the very beginning."<sup>16</sup> The press also commented on the ignoble part played by the U.S. Congress<sup>17</sup> and the notorious Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe, headed by Congressman D. Fancell, who is a member of the U.S. delegation in Madrid. The lengthy report of this committee, "Five Years After Helsinki," which flagrantly falsifies the fulfillment of the Helsinki agreements by the socialist countries and demurely says nothing about the U.S. line of undermining European detente, was given extensive coverage by the U.S. mass media, including the Voice of America radio station.

As the Madrid conference progressed, however, the American delegates had to give some consideration to public feelings, inside and outside the United States, in favor of the constructive progression of the meeting in the Spanish capital, and to the widespread support in political circles for the idea of military detente and disarmament in Europe.

At the end of November 1980, the American congressmen in the U.S. delegation in Madrid met with the head of the Soviet delegation, USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs L. F. Il'ichev. During this meeting, the Soviet side reaffirmed that the Soviet Union did not want the meeting to turn into a platform for ideological confrontation and would do everything within its power to make it a forum for the planning of constructive ways of safeguarding the security of the European continent, putting an end to military confrontation in Europe, deepening detente and improving mutual understanding between nations.

The head of the group of American congressmen, D. Fancell, said in a talk with newsmen that the meeting with the head of the Soviet delegation was a useful opportunity to learn more about the Soviet Union's stand on various issues. The American representative advocated the continuation of such contacts.

The question of how the election of R. Reagan to the U.S. presidency and the change of administration would affect the course of the Madrid meeting was discussed

thoroughly in the American press. In essence, all of the official statements by American diplomats boil down to an assertion that the election results in the United States "will have no effect on the delegation's behavior in Madrid."<sup>18</sup> "There are basic political issues which unite Reagan and Carter," M. Kampelman stressed. "I can say this quite definitely."<sup>19</sup>

It is obvious, however, that the change of administration in the United States will influence the position of the American delegation. Most American newsmen agree that the new administration is not likely to emphasize the moralizing "human rights" policy in the primitive and provocative style of J. Carter. According to the WASHINGTON POST, Reagan and some of his advisers "agree that the issue of human rights is not a matter of such paramount importance that it must be linked with all other issues in the overall political context."<sup>20</sup> The WASHINGTON STAR predicted that the future administration would change the methods for the implementation of the policy on "human rights" and, in particular, would limit the authority of the State Department's human rights office to make important international decisions.

The American newspapers have also discussed possible changes in the composition of the U.S. delegation in Madrid. According to NEW YORK TIMES correspondent J. Markham, G. Bell is Carter's minion and will play a largely ceremonial role in the initial stages of the conference and will then return to the United States.<sup>21</sup> Judging by all indications, M. Kampelman, an intimate of Senator H. Jackson, who maintains close contact with Reagan's chief advisers, has a somewhat better chance of "survival."

#### FOOTNOTES

1. A. K. Yefimov and N. R. Yur'yev, "On the Eve of the Madrid Conference," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 10, 1980--Editor's note.
2. THE WASHINGTON POST, 3 September 1980.
3. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 May 1980.
4. ATLANTIC NEWS, 8 February 1980.
5. Ibid., 30 January 1980.
6. See, for example, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 10 September 1980.
7. Ibid., 8 September 1980.
8. THE WASHINGTON POST, 3 September 1980.
9. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 31 July 1980.
10. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 8 September 1980, p 44.
11. FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1980, p 135.

12. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 11 September 1980.
13. FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1980, p 138.
14. THE WASHINGTON POST, 3 September 1980.
15. ATLANTIC NEWS, 1 August 1980.
16. DAILY TELEGRAPH, 4 September 1980.
17. See, for example, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 11 September 1980.
18. THE WASHINGTON POST, 7 November 1980.
19. Ibid., 10 November 1980.
20. Ibid.
21. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 7 November 1980.

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**EXPLORING THE CANADIAN SHELF**

**Moscow SBHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 pp 87-94**

**[Article by M. P. Krasnov]**

**[Not translated by JPRS]**

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## BOOK REVIEWS

### Contrasting Views of Detente

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 pp 95-97

[Review by A. A. Trynkov of the books "The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany" by William E. Griffith, Cambridge-London, The MIT Press, 1978, 234 pages; "Entspannungspolitik in Ost und West," edited by Hans Peter Schwarz and Boris Meissner, Koeln, Heymann, 1979, X + 307 pages; "Entspannungsbegriff und Entspannungspolitik in Ost und West," Berlin, Duncker & Humbolt, 1979, 86 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

### Canada Today

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 pp 97-100

[Review by T. V. Lavrovskaya of the book "Wspolczesna Kanada," edited by M. Dobroczynski and R. March, Warsaw, Polish Institute of International Relations, 1978, 247 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

### Brookings Economic Study

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 pp 100-102

[Review by V. G. Klinov of the book "Accounting for Slower Economic Growth. The United States in the 1970's" by Edward Denison, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1979, XIV + 212 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

### Network Competition in Television

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 pp 103-104

[Review by S. G. Orekhova of the books "Deciding What's News. A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time" by H. Gans, New York, Pantheon Books, 1979, XVII + 393 pages; "Inside ABC. American Broadcasting Company's Rise to Power" by S. Quinlan, New York, Hastings House Publishers, 1979, XIV + 290 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

### Subjective Political Definitions

Moscow SSIA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 pp 104-106

[Review by V. P. Shestakov of the book "Safire's Political Dictionary" by William Safire, An Enlarged, Up-to-Date Edition of the New Language of Politics, New York, Random House, 1978, 820 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

### The United States and the Pacific

Moscow SSIA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 p 106

[Review by Yu. K. Krasnov of the book "SShA i problemy Tikhogo Okeana. Mezhdunarodno-politicheskiye aspekty" (The United States and Pacific Problems. International Political Aspects), edited by V. P. Lukin, I. B. Bulay and V. A. Kremenyuk, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1979, 325 pages]

[Text] This collective work analyzes U.S. policy in the Pacific region. The authors focus on factors contributing to different trends in U.S. policy toward individual Pacific countries and toward the entire Pacific Basin. Two groups of such factors are examined in detail in the book.

The first group consists of economic factors. The Pacific countries, the book stresses, have traditionally been viewed by American monopolistic capital as important sales markets, sources of raw material and investment sites.

The authors distinguish between the following basic forms and fields of foreign policy expansion by the American monopolies: the accelerated growth of direct private capital investments, the rapid expansion of foreign trade, the trade in technological and administrative know-how, and tourism.

A prominent place in the work is occupied by an analysis of the military strategic plans of U.S. ruling circles in various regions--the Far East, Latin America, Southeast Asia and Oceania.

One interesting part of the book deals with some aspects of Soviet-American cooperation in the Pacific. On the bilateral level, the monograph states, the USSR and the United States have already established some basis for interrelations and could continue to expand mutually beneficial cooperation successfully. The authors stress, however, that the successes achieved in the first half of the 1970's through the policy of detente in Soviet-American relations were followed by energetic attempts by American opponents of detente to shift the emphasis in U.S. policymaking regarding the Pacific countries to the involvement of these countries in a struggle against the USSR and world socialism.

## Latin America

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 p 106

[Review by N. N. Georgiyev of the book "Latinskaya Amerika," A Reference Encyclopaedia (in two volumes), Vol I, Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1979, 575 pages]

[Text] This reference work was compiled jointly by the Institute of Latin American Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya Publishing House. More than 300 Soviet and foreign experts worked on the encyclopaedia, including scientific and cultural experts from Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico and several other countries in this region.

The articles in the encyclopaedia reflect the dynamic processes that are taking place in the economic, social, political and cultural life of individual countries and the continent as a whole. Special attention is given to the Cuban Revolution of 1959, which led to the creation of the first socialist state in the Western Hemisphere.

Factors contributing to the growth of the Latin American people's liberation struggle, particularly the effects of the world socialist system on this struggle, are analyzed in detail, and convincing facts are cited to testify to the increasing desire of several Latin American countries to conduct foreign policy more independently of the United States.

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## NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES. THE U.S. STAND

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 pp 107-115

[Article by V. F. Davydov]

[Text] The beginning of the 1980's was marked by the dramatic buildup of U.S. military preparations and attempts to expand American military presence abroad. Ignoring the realities of today's world and encroaching upon the sovereignty of independent states, Washington has officially declared huge territories, located in various parts of the world, zones of its "vital interests." On the pretext of safeguarding this interests, a "rapid deployment force" is being created, the network of overseas military bases and installations is being broadened, and new types of nuclear weapons are being developed. At the same time, the beginning of the new decade was marked by a more intense struggle by the peaceful forces of our planet against the threat of nuclear war, for the prohibition and liquidation of nuclear weapons and for the prohibition of the use of any kind of force in inter-governmental relations.

The problem of the nuclear-free zones is closely connected with this issue. As the final document of the 1978 Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament stressed, "another important step toward disarmament will consist in the conclusion of agreements and treaties by states in the regions concerned on the creation of zones free of nuclear weapons."<sup>1</sup> In 1979, the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly passed five resolutions on matters pertaining to the creation of nuclear-free zones in Latin America, Africa, South Asia and the Middle East. Several resolutions of the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1980 appeal to all states in the world for help in implementing the idea of nuclear-free zones.

The idea of creating nuclear-free zones was first brought up as one of the alternatives to the escalation of the nuclear threat in the mid-1950's. In 1956 the USSR set forth proposals that essentially constitute the basis of subsequent ideas about nuclear-free zones. In 1957, at the 12th Session of the UN General Assembly, the Polish delegation proposed the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.<sup>2</sup> It won the official support of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community and aroused a positive response from several other countries. In the ruling circles of NATO countries, however, this proposal was resisted by the advocates of a continued arms race, who were worried that the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe would undermine the plans for the nuclear equipping of this bloc's armed forces. As a result, no action was taken on the proposal.

The creation of nuclear-free zones has been suggested repeatedly by a number of states. Corresponding resolutions were passed at sessions of the UN General Assembly. By a decision of the 24th session, a group of experts, working with the Disarmament Commission in 1975, thoroughly analyzed the question of nuclear-free zones and recommended that the possibility of their creation in various parts of the world be investigated constructively and energetically by states.

By the beginning of the 1980's the campaign for the creation of nuclear-free zones had been given new momentum by states and public organizations and movements. In September 1980, for example, a regional conference was held in Sidney "For the Transformation of the Pacific Ocean into a Nuclear-Free Zone, For Independence and Peace." Conference participants, underscoring the potential danger of the deployment of American naval forces in the region, particularly with regard to the new Trident submarines, called for the organization of a broad campaign to protest the military threat and to declare the Pacific Ocean a nuclear-free zone. Today, there is particular interest in plans to create these zones wherever the possibilities exist for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by certain states--Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Northern Europe.

The idea of declaring Africa a nuclear-free zone was first set forth in 1960, at the 15th Session of the UN General Assembly, after France's first nuclear test in the Sahara. A group of African states submitted a draft resolution in which all UN members were requested to consider and acknowledge the African continent a nuclear-free zone. At the next session, the 16th, on the initiative of the same states, a resolution was passed which requested UN members to refrain from using the territory, water and air space of Africa for the testing, storage or transport of nuclear weapons and to consider and acknowledge the African continent a nuclear-free zone. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries actively supported this resolution, while the United States and its NATO allies took a negative stand on the pretext that the resolution would signify a moratorium on nuclear tests only for the Western countries, particularly France.

The declaration of Africa a nuclear-free zone was also favored by representative forums, such as the Addis Ababa conference of the heads of state and government of the independent African countries (1963) and the Cairo conference of the heads of state and government of the non-aligned countries (1964). One important step in this direction was the adoption of the statement on the declaration of Africa a nuclear-free zone at the first session of the assembly of heads of state and government of the Organization for African Unity (1964). This statement announced the willingness of the African countries to pledge, by international agreement, not to produce nuclear weapons or acquire control over them. In 1965 the 20th Session of the General Assembly supported this statement.<sup>3</sup>

The question of declaring Africa a nuclear-free zone was the subject of lively discussion within the United Nations throughout the 1960's and 1970's. In 1976, new aspects became apparent in the discussion of this issue in the United Nations. All of the African countries began to display obvious concern over the growth of South Africa's nuclear potential and the possibility that it might be used in the execution of racist policy in southern Africa. A resolution passed at the 31st session called upon states not to supply or provide South Africa with any kind of equipment, fissionable materials or technology that would give the racist regime the chance to develop a nuclear weapon.<sup>4</sup>

In 1979, the 34th Session of the General Assembly passed another resolution on a nuclear-free zone on the African continent, which firmly condemned South Africa's plans to acquire nuclear weapons and demanded the cessation of all forms of cooperation with the racist regime in the nuclear sphere. When the resolution was put to a vote, 128 states voted for it, including the USSR and the other socialist countries, and 11 abstained, including the United States and England--on the pretext that only the continuation of nuclear cooperation could extend IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] control to South African nuclear installations. In fact, however, Washington's obstructionist position was largely motivated by South Africa's variety of covert military and economic ties with the United States and other Western countries.

The extensive support of the idea of a nuclear-free zone in Africa by the countries of this continent, the socialist states and several Western countries is a significant indication that the time has come to take action on this idea and that there is good reason to believe that this undertaking will be successful. A conference on non-proliferation, held in Vienna in January-February 1980 under the auspices of the Stanley Foundation, and attended by experts from 16 countries, including the Soviet Union, ascertained that the African continent is a "most promising region, in the sense that a nuclear-free zone could be created there in the 1980's."<sup>5</sup>

The question of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East was discussed in 1974, at the 29th Session of the General Assembly, at the suggestion of Iran and Egypt. The resolution passed on this matter applauded this idea and appealed to the countries in this region to refrain from the production, testing and acquisition of any type of nuclear weapon and to sign the non-proliferation treaty. The resolution was widely supported, and all of the nuclear countries voted for it. Israel, on the other hand, frankly declared its negative stand on the matter.<sup>6</sup>

In 1978, at the 33d Session of the General Assembly, a resolution was passed to stop all types of cooperation with Israel that might promote the growth of its nuclear potential.

In 1979, the 34th session recommended the commencement of talks regarding the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. Some 136 countries voted for this resolution, including the United States. Israel abstained. At the same time, a resolution was passed to condemn Israel's policy of manufacturing and accumulating nuclear weapons in the region, and to order the Western countries to curtail all types of nuclear cooperation with Israel. In this vote, 97 countries were in favor of the resolution, and 10 were against it, including the United States and Israel.

American officials and the mass media have been frankly nervous that the fear of Israel's intentions could motivate other countries in the Middle East--Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia--to speed up their mastery of nuclear technology. "It appears that 1980 will be the year when the arms race in the Middle East becomes overtly nuclear,"<sup>7</sup> remarked BUSINESS WEEK. At the beginning of 1980, on the official level, Washington made a futile attempt to prevent the shipment of Italian nuclear equipment for scientific research purposes to Iraq. Iraq immediately pointed out the United States' two-faced approach to the use of nuclear technology. On the one hand, it votes against a resolution condemning the



development of nuclear weapons in Israel and, on the other, it objects to the peaceful use of nuclear technology in the Arab countries. The prospect of a nuclear race in the Middle East has made the implementation of the idea of a nuclear-free zone in this crisis region essential. American experts--MIT researcher T. Greenwood and a member of New York's Council on Foreign Relations, A. Pierre, believe that the permanent political tension in the Middle East and the absence of an all-encompassing Mid-East settlement are complicating the creation of a nuclear-free zone.<sup>8</sup> Columbia University Professor E. Halilzad suggested that the Middle East settlement could include the creation of a nuclear-free zone and the establishment of international control over Israeli nuclear installations, which are still not part of the IAEA system.<sup>9</sup>

As for South Asia, soon after nuclear devices were tested in India, Pakistan proposed the creation of a nuclear-free zone in this region. In 1974, the General Assembly approved this idea in principle and advised the countries concerned to begin consultations on this matter. Of the nuclear countries, the United States and the PRC voted for Pakistan's proposal; the USSR, as well as England and France, abstained. Pierre believes that "Pakistan's proposal could not have been serious because it looked more like a diplomatic ruse to create difficulties for New Delhi."<sup>10</sup> Islamabad's subsequent steps in the 1970's to accumulate nuclear technology and materials, capable of being used for military purposes, corroborated this opinion.

A draft resolution proposed by India also won support. It stated that the initiative to create nuclear-free zones should come from countries in the particular regions, with consideration for their characteristic features and geographic dimensions. The USSR voted for the resolution, while the United States, England, France and the PRC abstained. The votes on both resolutions testified to the complex political situation in South Asia, where intergovernmental conflicts have slowed down the implementation of these ideas. The problem of creating a nuclear-free zone in this region was discussed repeatedly at subsequent sessions of the General Assembly. In 1979, for example, a corresponding resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority of votes at the 34th session.

Washington's line of escalating tension in South Asia, which became apparent in 1980, and its willingness to give military assistance to Pakistan and China, on the pretext of the Afghan events, to the detriment of Indian interests evoked a negative response from American advocates of non-proliferation. On 19 February 1980, the WASHINGTON POST admitted that only the "alleviation of conflicts between Pakistan, India and the PRC can improve the prospects for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia."

A proposal on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe began to be discussed intensively in 1963 on the initiative of Finland's President U. Kekkonen. The draft envisages a ban on the testing and development of nuclear weapons and on the transfer of the right to own or utilize these weapons, a ban on the placement of nuclear weapons in a nuclear-free zone and a ban on joint ownership and shipment through this zone. An attempt was made to put forth joint initiatives in this sphere in the 1970's within the Northern Council (annual conferences of the heads of the Scandinavian governments). In 1978 the Soviet Union reaffirmed its fundamental support of this proposal. Its implementation, however, is being

impeded by the United States and several NATO countries in Northern Europe. Describing the U.S. approach, T. Greenwood stresses that "the proposal regarding a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe is arousing skepticism on the grounds that it contradicts the American nuclear obligations to the NATO allies."<sup>11</sup> In other words, these ideas are unacceptable to the Pentagon because they could undermine NATO nuclear preparations.

Although certain NATO members, such as Norway, objected to the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory, they are nonetheless participating in planning nuclear strategy and creating an infrastructure for the bloc. In March 1980, a bilateral agreement was signed by the United States and Norway on the deployment of U.S. weapons within Norway's territory. What is more, it was no coincidence that the nuclear planning group met in Boda (Norway) in June 1980.

Describing the United States' obvious attempts to involve the Northern European countries in NATO nuclear preparations, the 26 March 1980 issue of Sweden's DAGENS NYHETER remarked: "The United States is establishing massive military potential in direct proximity to Sweden for the first time. The danger lies in the increased probability that nuclear weapons will be used in Northern Europe."

The recent more frequent statements by public spokesmen and the press in several Northern European countries against the threat of nuclear war testify that the people of this region want to dissociate themselves from the NATO bloc's nuclear preparations and might give new momentum to the implementation of the proposal that this region be declared a nuclear-free zone. The importance and urgency of Finland's proposal that Northern Europe be declared a nuclear-free zone were underscored once again in the Soviet-Finnish communique on the results of President Urho Kekkonen's trip to the USSR in November 1980.

The Latin American nuclear ban treaty is the only document as yet to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons in a densely populated (more than 300 million people) and large part of the world (21 million square kilometers).

In 1962, during the 17th Session of the UN General Assembly, Brazil and several other states in this region submitted a draft resolution to the First Committee on the recognition of Latin America as a nuclear-free zone. In 1963, the 18th Session of the UN General Assembly approved the resolution declaring Latin America a nuclear-free zone. A preparatory commission was set up to carry out the resolution. The commission consisted of representatives of a number of Latin American countries, and this commission compiled a draft of the document after consulting with the parties concerned.<sup>12</sup> In 1969 the Latin American ban on nuclear weapons (the Tlatelolco Treaty) went into effect.

In accordance with Article 1 of the treaty, the sides pledged to prohibit and prevent the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition of nuclear weapons by any means on their territory, and also pledged not to acquire, store, install, deploy or in any way possess any kind of nuclear weapon. Besides this, the sides pledged to "refrain from conducting, encouraging or permitting, directly or indirectly, the testing, use, manufacture or production of any kind of nuclear weapon, or to possess it or control it."<sup>13</sup>



It should be noted that the obligations of the signatories include not only a refusal to develop their own nuclear weapons or to acquire them from third countries, but also a refusal to allow their territory to be used for the testing or deployment of nuclear weapons of any third country whatsoever. By virtue of this provision, the treaty can be interpreted in such a way that the territory of its signatories will not contain any military bases, storage facilities, testing grounds or other locations for the placement of the nuclear weapons of a foreign state.

Therefore, the list of obligations is fairly long, and this is an indisputably positive feature of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America. There is one significant omission, however: the absence of a ban on the transport of nuclear weapons through the territory of signatories by third states--that is, non-signatories. This allows for exceptions to the principle of "continental denuclearization."

The question of banning the transport of foreign nuclear weapons through the treaty's "sphere of influence" was discussed in the Preparatory Commission in 1967. After considerable pressure had been exerted by the United States,<sup>14</sup> however, the Latin American countries that have bilateral military relations with the United States or are connected to it by the military "Rio de Janeiro Treaty" (1947), accepted the American Government's demands under certain conditions and insisted on the exclusion of the word "transport" from the list of obligations in Article 1 of the Tlatelolco Treaty. In this way, there will be no obstacles to, for example, the passage of American ships carrying nuclear weapons through the Panama Canal, although Panama is party to the treaty, or to the flight of U.S. bombers carrying nuclear weapons over the Latin American countries.

Prominent Mexican attorney and diplomat Alfonso García Robles, chairman of the Preparatory Commission, agreed later that "the treaty would have been better if the transport of nuclear weapons had been...completely prohibited."<sup>15</sup>

Professor G. Quester, renowned expert on non-proliferation, feels that the Tlatelolco Treaty could much more effectively prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons among "threshold countries" in this region if the Pentagon firmly renounced, once and for all, its plans to use Latin American territory in its nuclear preparations.<sup>16</sup>

As Brazil's JORNAL DO BRASIL reported on 30 March 1980, "in 1974 the United States proposed the establishment of a military base in Brazil, equipped with missiles with nuclear warheads, to the Brazilian Government." This proposal was rejected.

Two protocols have been added to the treaty: Protocol I stipulates that the status of the nuclear-free zone must be observed by countries which actually or legally own territory within Latin America. These are the United States, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands. Protocol II concerns the obligation of nuclear states to observe the status of the zone and, in particular, to not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the countries party to the treaty and to not assist in their destruction in any form.

Protocol I was signed by all of the countries concerned, but ratified by only Great Britain and the Netherlands. In spite of President Carter's official promise

to urge congressional ratification of the protocol,<sup>17</sup> it still has not been ratified. This testifies that U.S. ruling circles and the Pentagon do not want legal restrictions imposed on the use of their nuclear forces. The second protocol has been signed and ratified by all of the nuclear powers--the USSR, the United States, England, France and the PRC.

A researcher from Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, C. Ebinger, feels that the signing of the Tlatelolco Treaty was not as much of a "serious departure" from Washington's approach to the problem of nuclear-free zones as officials tried to imply: "The Ford Administration refused to sign the treaty because it wanted to retain the U.S. right to deploy nuclear weapons on the Guantanamo base and transport them through the Panama Canal. When the Carter Administration signed Protocol I, it...reserved this right, and this was actually a continuation of the Ford Administration's policy."<sup>18</sup>

Defining the Soviet position on the Tlatelolco Treaty, L. I. Brezhnev said: "In accordance with its principled line of reducing the danger of nuclear war, the Soviet Union has also decided to become party to the international treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America. By doing this, we, just as other powers possessing nuclear weapons, will pledge not to aid the Latin American states to acquire nuclear weapons or to use such weapons against signatories of the treaty."<sup>19</sup>

Despite the treaty's definite shortcomings, the general consensus is that it will serve the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and could set an example for other countries desiring to make their contribution to this cause.

From the very beginning, the U.S. approach to the issue of nuclear-free zones was distinguished by the advancement of preliminary conditions, one of the central ones being the demand that the creation of these zones not undermine the existing military balance. What is more, this provision was interpreted in such a way that it justified the negative stand of U.S. ruling circles on these zones. As American researcher J. Grieco pointed out, strategic considerations often outweigh non-proliferation commitments.<sup>20</sup> A vivid example of this is the Indian Ocean zone, where the Pentagon plans to deploy nuclear weapons on Diego Garcia. The implementation of these plans could be the catalyst for the proliferation of nuclear arms among littoral countries on the pretext of safeguarding their security. American researcher E. Shettle stresses that the United States has always insisted that the "nuclear-free zones must not violate necessary security agreements."<sup>21</sup>

Besides this, America wants the non-nuclear countries to submit their plans to Washington for consideration, as if it were the chief "nuclear arbiter." In this way, the United States expects to retain a free hand in the conduct of global nuclear strategy.

It should be noted that several American authors, such as Princeton University Professor R. Falk, Admiral G. La Rocque, director of the Strategic Information Center, R. Garvin, former adviser to President L. Johnson, President R. Johansen of the Institute on the World Order and some others believe that a global nuclear strategy, backed up by military bases in various parts of the world, and nuclear obligations to other countries are inconsistent with the effective compliance with

non-proliferation regulations and could threaten the security of the United States. They are insistently recommending that policy in this area be corrected to envisage the removal of American nuclear weapons from overseas locations as a long-range goal.<sup>22</sup> As the primary current policy objective, they are issuing the demand that the United States make more specific commitments to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. R. Garvin stresses, for example, that "this policy would aid in the removal of American nuclear weapons from the territory of other countries."<sup>23</sup> D. Gompert, former Council on Foreign Relations researcher, believes that geographic restrictions on the placement of nuclear weapons, particularly in the Near and Far East, would reduce the risk of nuclear conflict in crisis zones.<sup>24</sup>

But the many proposals aimed at the "denuclearization" of various parts of the world and the reduction of nuclear danger are still being stubbornly opposed in the United States by those who advocate the pressuring of other countries with force, including nuclear force. Militaristic circles in the United States, obsessed with a desire to achieve strategic superiority to the USSR, are still ignoring the need to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation and strengthen the security of the non-nuclear countries. Their main argument is that nuclear-free zones could limit the freedom to use nuclear weapons. For example, former State Department adviser H. Sonnenfeldt asserts in "Setting National Priorities. Agenda for the 1980's," a work published by the Brookings Institution, that, in addition to the existing agreement on the exclusion of nuclear weapons from Latin America, the United States should also take a cautious approach to other such drafts. The United States must not give up the chance of resorting to the use of nuclear weapons in such regions as Western Europe and the Korean peninsula.<sup>25</sup>

But Washington's opposition does not stem only from purely military considerations. The legal definition of the nuclear-free zones would interfere with the fulfillment of U.S. "nuclear commitments" to its allies, which are being used by Washington to exert political pressure on these allies, particularly whenever disagreements and conflicts arise in connection with international political and economic issues. It is not surprising that the retention of allies and ally relations, in which Washington plays the leading role, is assigned unconditional priority in U.S. foreign policy. "When the United States is conducting policy in the area of non-proliferation, it must remember the priority interests of maintaining the unity of its allies,"<sup>26</sup> Sonnenfeldt asserts.

This adherence to bloc policy and the intensification of nuclear preparations, however, are sharply diminishing American diplomacy's maneuverability in matters concerning the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons. This is attested to by the growing "nuclear ambitions" of such "threshold countries" as South Africa, Israel and Pakistan, which are implementing Washington's policy line of confrontation.

In the first year or two of the Carter Administration, the idea of nuclear-free zones was repeatedly supported in official Washington statements. For example, the 25 April 1979 report of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency stresses that agreements on nuclear-free zones "will make an important contribution to the consolidation of international stability and security."<sup>27</sup> By the beginning of the 1980's, however, it became obvious that the United States was still concentrating



on the consolidation of its own strategic positions at the expense of the security of non-nuclear states and to their detriment.

There is no question, however, that the creation of nuclear-free zones would aid in reinforcing non-proliferation regulations and reduce the threat of nuclear war.

No single standard can be used as a guide in the creation of nuclear-free zones. Each region has its own distinctive features, which must be taken into account when the agreement pertaining to the region is drafted. There are some general specifications, however, which apply to the definition of the nuclear-free zone and which stem from the objectives facing nuclear-free zones and from their position in the overall system of international security. The main objective of the nuclear-free zone is the imposition of territorial restrictions on nuclear weapons, leading to the prevention of the growth of nuclear danger, and its chief criterion is the genuine absence of any kind of nuclear weapons within the zone. It is important to leave no loopholes for the circumvention of the zone's nuclear-free status.

The nuclear-free zone presupposes not only the commitment of non-nuclear countries to not accept, acquire or create nuclear weapons, but also the commitment of nuclear states to not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries located in the zone. To a considerable extent, the nuclear-free status of the zone can be guaranteed if, in addition to the pledges taken by non-nuclear states, all of the nuclear states pledge to respect this status. Therefore, the position taken by nuclear states and their pledge to not use nuclear weapons will ultimately determine the security of countries that have refused to acquire their own nuclear weapons or allow their territory to be used for the deployment of the nuclear weapons of others.

At the special session of the UN General Assembly in 1978, the Soviet Union announced that it would never use nuclear weapons against states which pledge not to produce or acquire such weapons and do not have them within their territory. Statements on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries were also made by other nuclear states, including the United States, but all of their statements, in contrast to the Soviet one, were accompanied by various provisos. The USSR did not limit itself to a formal statement; it proposed the legal wording of the pledge not to use nuclear weapons--"On the Conclusion of International Conventions To Strengthen Security Safeguards for Non-Nuclear States," the draft of which is now being examined by the Disarmament Commission in Geneva. At the same time, the USSR expressed its willingness to conclude special agreements on this matter with any non-nuclear country in the world.<sup>28</sup>

This approach not only simplifies the conclusion of agreements on the creation of nuclear-free zones, but also lends flexibility to the definition of the geographic outlines of nuclear-free zones. The zones can be whole continents (Latin America or Africa), vast geographic regions (the Middle East or Northern Europe) or even individual countries.

When the idea of the nuclear-free zone is acted upon, it is absolutely unnecessary for every single state in a region to become party to the agreement from the very beginning. The process could be started by a group of states or even by individual countries.

Another important factor that could simplify the implementation of this idea is the agreement of nuclear states not to deploy nuclear weapons in states which do not possess them at present. For this purpose, the Soviet Union proposed geographic restrictions on the deployment of nuclear weapons at the 33d UN Session in 1978. This proposal was supported by more than 100 countries. Only the states attached to the United States by military bonds, particularly within the NATO and ANZUS blocs, and Japan, voted against the proposal. In 1979 the 34th session advised the nuclear states to take a constructive look at the Soviet initiatives. As USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko stressed on 23 September 1980 at the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly, however, "the talks on this matter are progressing slowly, to say the least, due to the objections of some powers."<sup>29</sup> At this session, the Soviet Union submitted its memorandum "For Peace and Disarmament, For Guarantees of International Security." It expresses support for proposals regarding the creation of nuclear-free zones and solemnly reaffirms that the Soviet Union will never use nuclear weapons against those states which refuse to acquire them and do not have them within their territory.

At the same time, the Soviet delegation at the 35th session appealed to all states possessing nuclear weapons to support the Soviet proposals on the institution of immediate measures to reduce the danger of war, including guarantees against the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

The Soviet draft resolution on these matters had widespread repercussions among the members of the General Assembly and was widely supported by the majority of countries disturbed by the mounting threat of nuclear war.

The work of the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly clearly demonstrated that the increasing importance of the developing countries in world politics and the support of their legitimate demands for stronger security by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries will become the deciding factors in the implementation of the idea of nuclear-free zones in the 1980's.

During General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev's trip to India in December 1980, he reaffirmed the USSR's support for the idea of turning conflict zones into nuclear-free zones and its willingness to discuss this matter with all interested states. In his speech in the Indian Parliament on 10 December, L. I. Brezhnev made the following statement in reference to the tense situation in the Persian Gulf: "We propose that the United States, the other Western powers, China, Japan and all states expressing an interest in this matter agree on the following mutual commitments:

"To not establish foreign military bases in the Persian Gulf zone or on adjacent islands; to not deploy nuclear weapons or any other weapon of mass destruction there;

"To not use or threaten to use force against the Persian Gulf countries, and not interfere in their internal affairs;

"To respect the status of non-alignment chosen by states in the Persian Gulf zone; to not involve them in military groups with nuclear powers among their members."<sup>30</sup>



A constructive response to this Soviet initiative by the Republican Administration in the United States could be a great help in strengthening the security of the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean and creating nuclear-free zones in this part of the world, as demanded by the people who live here.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Razoruzheniye" (Disarmament), A Handbook, Moscow, 1979, p 129.
2. For more detail, see V. M. Khaytsman, "SSSR i problema razoruzheniya, 1945-1959" [The USSR and the Issue of Disarmament, 1945-1959], Moscow, 1970, pp 386-390.
3. See UN Doc A/RES /2033/XX, 3 December 1965.
4. UN Doc A/RES/69, 10 December 1976.
5. "Non-Proliferation, 1980's," Muscatine (Iowa), 1980, p 37.
6. The plan to sell nuclear reactors to Israel and Egypt, announced by President R. Nixon in 1974, aroused a definitely negative response in the United States because this, according to experts, could bring about, over the long range, the threat of nuclear confrontation in the Middle East. Several American experts, particularly H. Scoville, R. Pranger and D. Tahtinen, who take a positive view of the idea of the nuclear-free zone, objected to the offer of nuclear technology to opposing sides (R. Pranger and D. Tahtinen, "Nuclear Threat in the Middle East," Wash., 1975).
7. BUSINESS WEEK, 14 April 1980, p 55.
8. T. Greenwood et al, "Nuclear Proliferation," N.Y., 1977, p 64; A. Pierre and C. Moyne, "Nuclear Proliferation. A Strategy for Control," N.Y., 1976, p 49.
9. THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, January 1980, p 12.
10. A. Pierre and C. Moyne, Op. cit., p 49.
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12. For more detail, see A. Robles, "The Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone," Muscatine, 1979, pp 9-13.
13. Ibid., p 23.
14. G. Quester, "Brazil and Latin American Nuclear Proliferation: An Optimistic View," Los Angeles, 1979.
15. Disarmament Commission Doc CCD/PV/551, p 17.
16. G. Quester, Op. cit., pp 11-19.

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18. C. Ebinger, "Nuclear Politics," Wash., 1978, p 70.
19. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kurson" [Following the Leninist Course], vol 7, Moscow, 1979, p 296.
20. J. Grieco, "American Foreign Policy and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Issues and Options," POTOMAC REVIEW, Winter 1976, pp 12-23.
21. "Postures for Non-Proliferation," London, 1979, pp 143-144.
22. See D. Gompert, R. Garvin, M. Mandelbaum and J. Barton, "Nuclear Weapons and World Politics," N.Y., 1977, pp 129, 246; TRANSITION, November 1979; R. Johansen, "The Disarmament Progress," N.Y., 1977, pp 8-9.
23. D. Gompert et al, Op. cit., p 129.
24. Ibid., p 246.
25. "Setting National Priorities. Agenda for the 1980's," edited by J. Pechman, Wash., 1980, p 385.
26. Ibid., p 386.
27. "18th Annual Report to the Congress, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency," 1 January-December 1978, p 5.
28. See SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 4, 1979, pp 35-44.
29. PRAVDA, 24 September 1980.
30. Ibid., 11 December 1980.

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INFLATION AND THE RISE OF PRICES IN THE UNITED STATES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 pp 116-125

[Article by Yu. G. Kondrat'yev]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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## CONFERENCE OF YOUNG STUDENTS OF AMERICAN PROBLEMS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 81 pp 126-127

[Article by A. I. Nikitin]

[Text] A science theory conference on the "Strategy and Tactics of U.S. Imperialism at the End of the 1970's and the Beginning of the 1980's," organized by the institute's Council of Young Scientists was held in the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The conference was attended by young specialists from six scientific and academic institutions in Moscow. They discussed a number of problems connected with the analysis of current U.S. foreign policy and with the study of domestic political and ideological processes that influence the foreign policy line of the nation.

The debate on the topic of "The Causes and Consequences of the Turnabout in U.S. Foreign Policy at the End of the 1970's and the Beginning of the 1980's" began with a discussion of the current international economic position of the United States and its effect on Washington's foreign policy activity. Noting the increased raw material and, in particular, oil dependence of the United States on the outside world, as well as the stronger interdependence of American production and the world economy, A. Izyumov (ISKAN [Institute of U.S. and Canada Studies]) asked to what extent the need to safeguard the nation's immediate economic interests was a propaganda formula, and to what extent it was the actual reason for the energization and "globalization" of U.S. actions in the international arena.

In their reports, V. Chernov and A. Primakov (ISKAN) and R. Sergeyev and V. Lukov (Moscow State Institute of International Relations--MGIMO) said that one of the goals of U.S. foreign policy activity at this time of mounting inter-imperialist conflicts and "centrifugal" tendencies in the capitalist world is to regain this country's leading role, so to speak, in its previous volume, and to achieve the closer strategic and economic "attachment" of Western Europe to the United States. Different opinions about the current status of the political and economic positions of the United States and the EEC countries were expressed in the discussion. According to V. Chernov and A. Primakov, the use of political and military leverage has brought about relative improvement in the economic position of the United States. The view that finally prevailed, however, was the one expressed by, in particular, S. Karaganov (ISKAN), V. Lukov (MGIMO) and T. Alekseyeva (Institute of World Economics and International Relations--IMEMO): that the temporary improvement in the U.S. economic position should not be viewed as a lasting tendency, and that the U.S. move toward foreign policy activism and "globalism" has not been reinforced by a corresponding shift in economic strategy.

As S. Kortunov (ISKAN) stressed, the United States' ability to influence international relations obviously decreased over the last decade. As current events have demonstrated, even within the U.S.-Western Europe-Japan "triangle," the common sociopolitical structures of partners and rivals do not at all signify a community of specific economic and political goals.

In their speeches, S. Kortunov and R. Sergeyev spoke of changes in U.S. military strategy, particularly in matters involving the use of armed force. Continuing the discussion of the military means of attaining U.S. foreign policy objectives, V. Lukov described the doctrinal origins of Washington's new military policy--essentially an effort to disrupt the existing parity of strength. Amplifying S. Kortunov's statement that U.S. ruling circles are now concentrating on turning the arms race into the focal point of the competition between the two systems, A. Korobeynikov (IMEMO) and V. Terekhov (MGU [Moscow State University]) analyzed American scenarios for economic competition with the USSR during the course of the arms race. Concluding this discussion, I. Akhtamzyan (MGIMO), A. Primakov and other speakers pointed out that Washington's increased concern for the maintenance of regional balances of power, for the heightened mobility and forward basing of its own armed forces, and for medium-range nuclear weapons and more powerful conventional weapons testifies in general to attempts to disrupt or bypass the strategic parity established and acknowledged by both sides.

How are current foreign policy realities reflected in public opinion, and how are "globalist" forceful advances in foreign policy substantiated and provided with an ideological framework? In their reports, I. Malashenko and A. Nikitin (ISKAN) tried to answer these questions. They underscored the precarious and contradictory nature of U.S. public opinion in support of a more active foreign policy. In particular, they said that Americans, according to the data of public opinion polls, prefer a cautious approach to international situations and conflicts in which U.S. intervention is possible; the overwhelming majority of Americans favor non-military forms and methods of intervention.

Speakers listed several factors which can limit--and are limiting--the militant "globalism" of the United States. Above all, there is the growing economic, political and military strength of the socialist countries. People throughout the world, and even in the United States, are gradually realizing that the United States had an inappropriate reaction, reminiscent of U.S. policy of the 1950's, to the pluralization of the world balance of power, and an inappropriate response to its allies' desire for independence and to the processes taking place in the developing countries. Speakers also directed attention to the conflict between measures for the continued growth of the U.S. military budget and the increasing demands by Americans for the redistribution of government funds and efforts for the resolution of domestic socioeconomic problems.

Some reports on aspects of U.S. foreign and military policy and on ideological issues and the ideological struggle were also presented at the conference. Abundant information about the subject matter of the debate was presented in the report by A. Vishnevskiy (Central Institute of Military-Technical Information) on "The American Policy of Military Intervention and the Methods of Its Execution" and the reports by T. Alekseyeva (IMEMO) on "The Basic Tendencies in U.S. Foreign Policy and Military Policy Activity in Northern Europe" and S. Andreyev (IMEMO) on "The United States and the Attempts To Strengthen NATO's Southern Flank." Some domestic



political factors affecting U.S. foreign policy were analyzed in speeches by N. Il'ina (Institute of the International Workers Movement) on "The Issues of Detente and Disarmament in the Activity of American Labor Unions" and A. Pankin (ISKAN) on "The Position of the Mass Media in the Foreign Policy Complex." Valuable material for discussion was presented in the reports by M. Oborotova (IMEMO) on "The Revolutionary Process in Central America and U.S. Foreign Policy" and T. Yarkho (MGU) on "Criticism of the Interpretation of the Revolutionary Situation by American Bourgeois Political Scientists," and in several other reports.

The conference helped to establish new scientific contacts and to acquaint participants with the subject matter and purpose of studies of U.S. problems that are being conducted in various Moscow institutes. When the results of the debate were summed up, it was noted that it had helped to provide participants with a comprehensive understanding of the causes, essence and consequences of the changes in U.S. foreign policy at the turn of the decade, provided a creative atmosphere for the discussion of new ideas and hypotheses and united the theoretical efforts of specialists in various fields.

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